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One-party consent and all-party consent eavesdropping and wiretapping 
statutes are two broad pathways for federal and state legislation to deal with the 
problem of secret taping; in addition, some states protect conversation under 
state constitutions. Whether a conversation is protected against being taped as a 
private conversation is often gauged by the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard. Judges in both all-party consent and one-party consent jurisdictions 
have had to use their leeway under the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard to arrive at what at the time seemed to be the most appropriate solution, 
perhaps in doing so creating a case-law exception. 
Although privacy is difficult to define, Alan Westin provided the following 
definition in his classic book Privacy and Freedom: “Privacy is the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”1 An 
individual who provides private information to the government or to a second 
individual loses control over the information, ceding power to another entity or 
individual. The individual may feel helpless in the face of such a loss. 
Curiosity about the private activities of others and enforcement of laws 
through government surveillance are widespread yet have their limits. 
Eavesdropping, typified by nosy neighbors secretly spying upon one’s private 
conversations, has been disfavored for hundreds of years. Another historic 
privacy protection is against government intrusion, enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as the prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure. The right against unreasonable search and 
seizure is similarly safeguarded in the Bill of Rights provisions of the 
constitutions of all fifty states, with the constitutions of certain states explicitly 
guaranteeing a right to privacy. There were some historic exceptions to the right 
to privacy. By the 1900s, law enforcement was using government informants to 
secretly intercept a suspect’s conversations and could use a wiretap to secretly 
listen to a suspect’s telephone conversations. 
Federal protection against eavesdropping and wiretapping did not come until 
two-thirds through the twentieth century. In United States v. Katz in 1967,2 the 
United States Supreme Court announced that Fourth Amendment protection 
covered wiretapping so long as the suspect had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The following year, Congress enacted federal legislation regulating 
government and private citizen eavesdropping and wiretapping.3 The federal 
                                                          
 1 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). The reasonable expectation of 
privacy test came from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz: “there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”; Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 3 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
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legislation did permit recording with the consent of one party to the 
conversation. Some states had already enacted protection against eavesdropping 
and wiretapping by 1968 and most states followed suit after 1968.4 Many states 
followed the federal legislation, permitting recording with the consent of one 
party to the conversation. However, a minority of the states require all party 
consent to record a conversation.5 
Section I explains the reasons for communication privacy protection. Section 
II includes case-law examples of states deciding whether to protect privacy 
under state constitutions, with a primary focus on an informant or a police officer 
and the home. Section III gives an overview of state constitutional privacy 
provisions and the subject matter of state eavesdropping and wiretapping 
statutes. Sections IV and V provide case-law examples interpreting all-party and 
one-party consent statutes. Section VI gives an overview of judicial discretion 
in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. Sections VII, VIII, 
and IX review case-law interpreting state constitutions, all-party consent 
statutes, and one-party consent statutes with a focus on the use of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard. 
I. COMMUNICATION PRIVACY 
Rapid advances in technology that might almost effortlessly and secretly 
capture otherwise private conversation are a cause for concern. In 1966, certain 
scholars were sufficiently prescient to recognize that the effects of technology 
on privacy should be studied: “Of paramount importance was the challenge 
perceived to individual privacy. Not only privacy from unscrupulous, criminal, 
or pathological persons. Not alone privacy from aggregations of public or private 
power, but privacy also from simply the aggressive, or the curious, who may be 
tempted to use the new techniques.”6 
In a conversation disclosing intimate or confidential details, the person 
speaking may be trusting in their relationship with the other parties to the 
conversation that the other parties not reveal matters disclosed in confidence. 
There may be little difference in some circumstances of recounting the substance 
of a conversation versus playing the tape of a conversation. A party to a 
conversation is typically unconstrained from repeating the conversation later. 
                                                          
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2521). 
 4 Laws on Recording Conversations In All 50 States (2019), MATTHIENSEN, WICKERT & 
LEHRER, S.C., https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/RECORDING-
CONVERSATIONS-CHART.pdf (last updated Oct. 24, 2019). 
 5 Id. at 2. 
 6 Oscar M. Ruebhausen, Preface to ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM ix & xi 
(1967). 
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Another party shows respect for the speaker in keeping the information 
confidential. However, the speaker may not have gauged the relationship 
accurately as one of trust, or the parties may have a falling out. One party may 
harbor ill-will toward the speaker that the speaker is unaware of and may have 
malicious intentions in secretly taping a conversation. A party who discloses the 
speaker’s information breaches the speaker’s trust and confidence, 
demonstrating disrespect for the speaker. 
An outsider or a false friend, such as an informant, may use false pretenses to 
enter an otherwise private area to secretly tape a conversation. Each individual 
has something that the individual would rather keep hidden from public view. 
Someone else might use the private information to the individual’s disadvantage. 
The information might appear to embarrass or discredit the individual, tarnish 
the individual’s reputation, expose the individual to ridicule or scorn, or place 
the individual in disrepute. An outsider may use an individual’s personal 
information to blackmail the individual. 
Keeping something hidden may be sometimes equated with having done 
something wrong that the person wants to conceal or keep secret. A common 
misperception is that one has nothing to hide if one has done nothing wrong. 
This perception may persuade society to sacrifice individual privacy in favor of 
national security when faced with a crisis.7 However, the Fourth Amendment 
guarantees the individual’s security by prohibiting government intrusion into the 
individual’s privacy.8 The individual should be able to safeguard private 
information free from government intrusion and without fear that it may be 
secretly recorded, whether by government agents or by others. Privacy is a 
valuable individual commodity vital to the person’s wellbeing and should be 
viewed as positive. Human nature desires a certain modicum of respite or 
personal distance from others and needs to control the flow of personal 
information to others. Privacy enables the individual to determine when, where, 
and in what manner personal details are disclosed to others. 
Erratic or aberrant behavior may lead to unreasonable suspicion of someone 
who operates outside usual societal norms even if the behavior is in no way 
unlawful and might be forward-thinking, simply an expression of individuality. 
What society characterizes as negative differences can be strengths when an 
individual arrives at alternate solutions to problems faced. The initial reaction 
might be for society to ostracize someone exhibiting deviant but not unlawful or 
harmful behavior. Expression of varying viewpoints may be valuable. The 
individual exhibiting behavior outside the norm might be acting out of an 
                                                          
 7 See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 748–53 (2007). 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. IV; e.g., Derek M Alphran, Changing Tides: A Lesser Expectation of 
Privacy in a Post 9/11 World, 13 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 89, 95 (2019). 
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artistic, musical, or intellectual bend that later is recognized as genius. The 
behavior may be an expression of free speech or political activism even if society 
has a negative regard for behavior differing from the norm. Disclosure of the 
behavior may result in the individual having to justify the behavior. 
The individual finds it almost impossible to successfully conduct business, 
professional, governmental, and personal affairs without verbally 
communicating information to others. There may be good reasons to prohibit 
secret taping to guard against loss of trade secrets, business information 
beneficial to a competitor, government secrets crucial to national security, 
strategic information of a political party, and secrets of private and religious 
organizations. The information disclosed in an otherwise private conversation 
may be sensitive or intimate, such that disclosing it would injure someone 
psychologically or physically. Giving someone with nefarious motives access to 
financial or other sensitive information may lead to financial insecurity or loss. 
Disclosing secretly taped information may lead to hurt feelings of insecurity, 
embarrassment, or betrayal and may damage one’s reputation or personality, 
perhaps by placing someone in a false light. If the taping involves a politician, 
an opposing candidate could use a secretly made tape to the opposing 
candidate’s advantage. Some fear that legalizing one-party taping may stifle free 
and open conversation. Some may value privacy above the ability to later share 
a tape of a conversation with others. 
Safeguarding certain areas of one’s life as personal may be essential to one’s 
wellbeing, dignity, reputation, intellectual freedom, freedom of association, and 
personal autonomy. The individual must keep a certain social distance between 
the individual and other members of society. The individual needs an area safe 
from interference by society or one might feel powerless and unable to freely 
control one’s decisions. At times, the individual merits an area of seclusion free 
from outside intrusion. Outside intrusion into one’s personal life may inhibit 
one’s activities, may harm one’s reputation, and do harm to a person’s psyche 
by permitting social control. 
Fear of surveillance may lead to one’s inability to make decisions freely. 
Discrete pieces of information, which do not harm the individual, might be 
aggregated to invade a person’s privacy. Society may gain a mistaken, distorted 
impression of the individual, should less than the whole story be revealed. The 
harm may be incremental as an outsider pieces together information about the 
individual’s private life. Sometimes, an individual discloses personal 
information for a limited purpose to a third party with the understanding that the 
information will not be further disclosed. Loss of privacy may be a product of 
information being used for a purpose different from the reason for which it was 
originally collected. Knowledge of one’s otherwise private information can 
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create a power imbalance with an outsider forcing the individual to behave in a 
certain way or lose privileges or opportunities. 
It used to be that one could be assured of privacy if speaking in an enclosed 
space and, to some extent, society is comfortable with the loss of privacy 
attendant on technological advances; however, technology has made vast 
inroads into what was formerly considered private. With recording capability 
available in each cell phone, it is tempting to tape conversations. This contrasts 
with the limited access to recording equipment prior to the ubiquity of the cell 
phone that nearly each person carries. With the ready access to cell phone 
recording capability, one might anticipate many conversations being secretly 
taped. 
In the past, the invasiveness of one not a party to a conversation taping the 
conversation has seemed much more intrusive than a party taping a conversation. 
Rapid advances in technology may have altered this perception. The common-
place use of technology, such as digital assistants, child monitors, children’s 
toys, and home and business security systems, has impacted this viewpoint. This 
technology is readily available, widely used, and heavily promoted. Many front 
home entrances and garages are protected against theft through the use of 
security systems with audio and video recording capability. These security 
systems capture the actions and conversations of anyone within range, including 
neighbors and persons passing by. 
One may have a socially beneficial reason for secretly taping a conversation, 
such as gathering evidence of criminal activity or exposing other wrongdoing. 
This behavior includes unlawful discrimination, abuse, and sexual harassment. 
Alleged abuse might include child, sexual, domestic, or elder abuse, evidence of 
which is otherwise almost impossible to gather. A taped conversation is 
considerably more reliable and accurate than a party testifying later about the 
content of the conversation, even if the testimony is convincing. The recorded 
conversation is direct, substantive evidence of what transpired. A recorded 
conversation is more powerful than secondhand testimony about the 
conversation because the recording memorializes the conversation and captures 
the exact words used, the tone of voice, and other inflections that might not 
otherwise be apparent. Someone who later tries to distort the conversation runs 
the risk of being confronted with the taped conversation. Other legitimate 
reasons for taping include transparency, security, and speaker accountability, 
especially for one with administrative, monitoring, or reporting responsibilities. 
Sometimes social good and the individual’s privacy must be balanced against 
each other. The government often uses friends of the suspect as government 
informants. Use of government informants is troublesome in that it diminishes 
the suspect’s freedom of association. The suspect may disclose sensitive 
information to a longtime friend turned government informant and the informant 
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may be motivated out of self-preservation to gather illicit information from the 
suspect to garner better treatment from the government. With the prevalence of 
criminal statutes, government monitoring of private activities is troublesome. 
An activity that might seem innocuous may become the basis for prosecution 
when combined with other circumstances. The government may assume that one 
fitting a particular stereotype will act in a stereotypical way. The individual 
cannot refute this conclusion if the individual is unaware of the conclusion. 
One-party consent could permit an informant to secretly tape a conversation, 
to the detriment of the suspect’s sense of security and susceptibility to 
government surveillance. The pernicious effect of informant taping could be 
multiplied by the informant transmitting the conversation to non-participant 
government agents. In United States v. White, a government informant secretly 
transmitted a number of a suspect’s conversations, one of which occurred in the 
suspect’s home, to third-party government agents.9 The conversation was not 
recorded so it was admitted at trial without issue.10 The government agents who 
conducted the surveillance testified at White’s trial, and the jury convicted 
White.11 The informant was unavailable and did not testify at trial.12 In 1971, in 
a plurality decision in White, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
electronic surveillance did not violate White’s Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizure.13 
White exposes two opposing views on how a suspect’s conversation should 
be analyzed. One view is that whatever the suspect voluntarily reveals to another 
is at the risk that the second party may repeat or record the conversation. The 
White plurality explained that, “[i]nescapably, one contemplating illegal 
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the 
police.”14 A suspect’s taped conversation benefits from accuracy in that “[a]n 
electronic recording will many times produce a more reliable rendition of what 
a defendant has said than will the unaided memory of a police agent.”15 Other 
benefits of taping are that “[i]t may also be that with the recording in existence 
it is less likely that the informant will change his mind, less chance that threat or 
injury will suppress unfavorable evidence and less chance that cross-
examination will confound the testimony.”16 
The second view, represented by Justice Harlan’s dissent, focused on the 
                                                          
 9 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971). 
 10 Id. at 749. 
 11 Id. at 747. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 754. 
 14 Id. at 752. 
 15 Id. at 753. 
 16 Id. 
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suspect’s expectation of privacy.17 Constitutional protection should be afforded 
to a suspect’s conversation in a situation in which the suspect’s sense of security 
is heightened. In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated, “[f]or those more extensive 
intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense of security, which is the 
paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties, I am of the view that more 
than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required and at the least 
warrants should be necessary.”18 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROVISIONS, 
INFORMANTS, AND THE HOME 
As stated in the introduction, the constitutions of certain states include an 
explicit right to privacy. In addition, the courts of certain states have interpreted 
the state constitution to protect communication privacy. 
The home has long been recognized as a place deserving special protection 
against government surveillance. An informant often is a false friend who has 
known the suspect in the past but is not acting in a trustworthy fashion in 
gathering evidence from the suspect. An informant usually acts at the behest of 
the government, not out of a desire to perform a public act but to receive a 
personal benefit such as a reduced sentence. The entrance of an informant 
equipped with a radio transmitter or a secret recording device into a suspect’s 
home is a lethal combination. The plurality decision in United States v. White 
has been roundly criticized as representing one of the worst configurations of 
government surveillance, with one of the conversations with White secretly 
transmitted by the informant from the sanctity of White’s home.19 
As more fully described below, the highest courts in six states have interpreted 
the state constitutions to outlaw secret taping of a suspect by an informant in the 
suspect’s home. Those six states are Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia. The Supreme Court of Wyoming 
declined to provide a similar protection under the Wyoming Constitution. The 
Supreme Court of Connecticut declined to require all-party consent protection 
under the Connecticut Constitution for telephone conversations. The Supreme 
Court of North Dakota declined to require all-party consent protection for a face-
to-face conversation occurring in an informant’s vehicle. 
                                                          
 17 Id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 18 Id. at 786–87. 
 19 Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment: A Reconsideration, 74 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 573, 613–26  (1996). 
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A. Alaska 
Alaska is one of the states that explicitly protects privacy in its Constitution. 
Article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution provides: “The right of the people 
to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall 
implement this section.”20 The Alaskan legislature has not chosen to protect its 
citizens against secret taping through all-party consent, instead permitting secret 
taping on the consent of one party. Even so, the Supreme Court of Alaska has 
interpreted the privacy provision of the Alaskan Constitution to require all-party 
consent when the suspect is in the suspect’s home but not when the suspect is on 
a roadway or in a workplace.21 
In 1978 in State v. Glass, narcotics team officers sent an informant equipped 
with a radio transmitter into Glass’ home to purchase heroin from Glass.22 The 
police officers stationed outside Glass’ home monitored and recorded the 
conversation through the radio transmission.23 The Supreme Court of Alaska 
pointed out that a state constitution could provide broader protection to a suspect 
than that guaranteed under the United States Constitution: “Federal courts have 
recognized the power of the states to regulate rights to privacy in a manner 
broader than the federal protections.”24 
In interpreting the privacy provision of the state constitution, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska looked to Katz v. United States for guidance. In Katz, the United 
States Supreme Court reasoned that “[o]ne who occupies [the phone booth], 
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is 
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be 
broadcast to the world.”25 Although the facts of Glass more closely paralleled 
those of White than the facts of Katz, the Supreme Court of Alaska declined to 
follow White because White was not “a clear-cut agreement by any majority of 
the justices.”26 In addition, the Supreme Court of Alaska pointed out that because 
there were eight monitored conversations in White, “based on an affidavit of the 
informant as to earlier non-monitored conversations, a warrant was 
obtainable.”27 
After reviewing Katz, the Supreme Court of Alaska applied the two-prong test 
of Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion and stated, “[w]e believe that one who 
                                                          
 20 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 21 State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874–75 (Alaska 1978). 
 22 Id. at 874. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 879. 
 25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 26 Glass, 583 P.2d at 876. 
 27 Id. at 880–81. 
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engages in a private conversation is similarly entitled to assume that his words 
will not be broadcast or recorded absent his consent or a warrant.”28 The court 
reasoned that it would not have been too onerous for law enforcement officers 
to have obtained a warrant prior to recording Glass’ conversation with the 
informant.29 The court concluded that “Alaska’s Constitution mandates that its 
people be free from invasions of privacy by means of surreptitious monitoring 
of conversations.”30 
Following Glass, the parameters of the Alaska Constitution’s protection 
against secret recordings was unclear. The privacy protection was fleshed out to 
some extent in 1984 in City and Borough of Juneau v. Quinto and in 2001 in 
Cowles v. State.31 
In 1984, in Quinto, a police officer taped his conversation with Quinto who 
was suspected of driving drunk.32 The officer made the recording by using a 
small tape recorder attached to the officer’s belt.33 The officer began taping as 
he approached Quinto and the taping continued throughout Quinto’s arrest.34 
The court noted that even though Quinto did not know that the conversation was 
being taped, he should have known that he was speaking with a police officer 
because the officer was in uniform.35 
The Supreme Court of Alaska considered the circumstances of the vehicle 
stop: “Lewkowski stopped Quinto based upon a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that Quinto was driving while intoxicated. Thus, the stop was lawful. 
Quinto knew, or reasonably should have known, that he was speaking to a police 
officer, since Lewkowski was in full uniform.”36 The court added, “[a]lso, it 
should have been clear to Quinto that Lewkowski was performing his official 
duties throughout the period covered by the recording.”37 The court concluded 
that the recording did not violate the privacy provision of the Alaska 
Constitution: “Under these circumstances, we hold that Quinto’s expectation of 
privacy, i.e. his assumed expectation that his conversation with Lewkowski 
would not be recorded, is not an expectation which society is willing to accept 
as reasonable.”38 
The court recognized that the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution 
                                                          
 28 Id. at 875. 
 29 Id. at 881. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 128 (Alaska 1984); Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168 
(Alaska 2001). 
 32 Quinto, 684 P.2d at 128. 
 33 Id. at 129. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 128, nn.2–4. 
 36 Id. at 129. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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was designed to protect “those values and characteristics typical of and 
necessary for a free society. Some of these are the sharing of thoughts and ideas, 
personal trust between individuals, free expression, and individuality.”39 The 
key in Quinto was the presence of a police officer investigating drunk driving, 
“[i]n such case, one’s candor and willingness to share personal confidences are 
unlikely to be any more effectively chilled than they already are by the added 
possibility that what is being said may be electronically recorded.”40 
In 2001, in Cowles v. State, Lindalee Cowles was suspected of stealing cash 
from the University of Alaska’s box office.41 To gather evidence on the alleged 
theft, the university police installed a hidden video camera in the ceiling above 
Cowles’ desk, which captured Cowles’ theft but no audio.42 A co-worker had 
reported the cash theft and an audit showed cash shortages.43 Cowles’ desk was 
visible to the public through the ticket window and there was a flow of persons 
through the box office during the taping.44 Cowles claimed that the videotaped 
evidence should be suppressed because the evidence was obtained in violation 
of her constitutional rights.45 
The three-justice majority of the Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that 
“Cowles did not have an expectation of privacy at the time and place in question 
that society should recognize as reasonable.”46 The physical layout of the ticket 
office was crucial in the decision: “[T]he University box office was not a private 
office . . . . It was open to the public at the time of the videotaping. Moreover, 
numerous University employees, who were in no sense co-conspirators of 
Cowles, had regular access to it.”47 
In a lengthy dissent, the remaining two justices opined that the Alaska 
Constitution privacy provision should have excluded the videotaped evidence 
because Cowles’ expectation of privacy was reasonable: “No case law or other 
authority supports the novel proposition that an employee’s fiduciary duty 
should reduce her reasonable expectation of privacy from police surveillance at 
her desk. . . .”48 The dissent added: “Today’s holding dramatically restricts the 
rights of Alaskans who do not occupy their own offices: It establishes that secret 
video monitoring by the police should be among their reasonable 
                                                          
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168, 1170 (Alaska 2001). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1175. 
 47 Id. at 1174. 
 48 Id. at 1185 (Fabe, J., dissenting). 
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expectations.”49 
B. Connecticut 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has interpreted the Connecticut 
Constitution to require only one party to consent to secretly tape a telephone 
conversation. 
In 2015, in State v. Skok, Skok allegedly defrauded Becker, an elderly widow 
of tens of thousands of dollars.50 When her granddaughter became suspicious, 
family members contacted the police who provided equipment so that Becker 
could secretly tape telephone calls with Skok.51 Skok claimed that secretly 
taping Skok’s telephone conversation with Becker with one party’s consent 
violated the search-and-seizure provision of the Connecticut Constitution.52 The 
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Connecticut Constitution did not 
make the secret taping with one party’s consent unconstitutional.53 In making 
this determination, the court used a six-factor analysis,54 but the court concluded 
that Skok’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable because Skok reminded 
Becker a number of times that Becker should not permit family to overhear their 
conversation, indicating that Skok believed in the possibility that Becker’s 
family would overhear the conversations.55 The Connecticut statutes are unusual 
in that one whose telephone conversation has been secretly taped, without the 
consent of all parties, has a private right of action against the party who secretly 
taped the conversation, but the secret taping was not a crime.56 Presumably, this 
is the reason that Skok tried to have the secretly taped conversation suppressed 
under the state constitution rather than under state statute.57 
C. Massachusetts 
The Massachusetts Constitution does not contain an explicit privacy 
provision; however, in 1987, in Commonwealth v. Blood, the Supreme Judicial 
                                                          
 49 Id. 
 50 State v. Skok, 122 A.3d 608, 610–11 (Conn. 2015). 
 51 Id. at 612. 
 52 Id. at 610. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 614. 
 55 Id. at 621. 
 56 Id. at 620. 
 57 A state statute permits a conversation to be suppressed, but only if the taping was 
illegal. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41m (West 2020); Another state statute makes it a 
class D felony to illegally wiretap a conversation. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189; 
However, the definition of wiretapping excludes recording a telephone conversation on one-
party consent. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-187(a)(1). 
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Court of Massachusetts held that the search-and-seizure provision of the 
Massachusetts Constitution safeguards against electronic interception by an 
informant secretly facilitating police officers taping conversations.58 
In Blood, Hudson was a convicted felon who agreed to act as an informant 
and to wear a hidden radio transmitter so that police officers could secretly tape 
conversations in which Blood and others formulated a plan to steal gold bars 
from a refinery.59 Hudson participated in three planning conversations, each of 
which occurred in a private home.60 Hudson transmitted the three conversations 
to police officers who secretly taped them.61 The prosecution used the taped 
conversations at Blood’s trial, and Blood was convicted.62 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the Massachusetts 
statute governing electronic surveillance against the search-and-seizure 
provision of the Massachusetts Constitution.63 The statute generally requires all-
party consent to tape a conversation.64 An exception permits a police officer who 
is a party to the conversation or has the consent of a party to the conversation to 
secretly tape the conversation if the conversation concerns one of the listed 
organized-crime offenses.65 Presumably, the circumstances in Blood, like the 
circumstances in a number of the cases discussed below, would have permitted 
the taping under the Massachusetts statute because a party to the conversations 
had given his consent to the taping to the police officers and the conversations 
concerned organized crime offenses.66 
The Massachusetts court recognized how the circumstances in Blood were 
similar to those in United States v. White, but the court criticized the plurality 
decision in White because the decision failed to take into account the paramount 
importance of “conversational liberty” and the chilling effect of a “consenting 
informant.”67 For the Massachusetts court, the liberty of conversing with friends 
was vital to a free society: “For us, however, a distinction lies in the disparity 
between that sense of security which is felt among trusted friends and the 
feelings of hostility encountered among competitors or combatants. The sense 
of security is essential to liberty of thought, speech, and association.”68 
The Massachusetts court noted that the locations of the conversations in Blood 
                                                          
 58 Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1038 (Mass. 1987). 
 59 Id. at 1030. 
 60 Id. at 1030–31. 
 61 Id. at 1030. 
 62 Id. at 1030–31. 
 63 Id. at 1031–32. 
 64 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 at B4, B7, C1 (West 2020). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1030 (Mass. 1987). 
 67 Id. at 1035. 
 68 Id. at 1036. 
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were private homes, and there were no exigent circumstances involved: “Each 
conversation whose recorded contents was admitted at trial had unfolded in a 
person’s home, in circumstances not even remotely suggestive of any speaker’s 
intent to be heard beyond the circle of known listeners.”69 The court concluded 
that the secret taping violated the search-and-seizure provision of the 
Massachusetts Constitution: “As to each of those conversations, we hold that its 
warrantless electronic search by surreptitious transmission and its electronic 
seizure by surreptitious recording were in violation of art. 14.”70 
After Blood, it was unclear how the court’s interpretation of the search-and-
seizure provision of the Massachusetts Constitution would be applied. The 
following year, in Commonwealth v. Fini, the court considered whether a 
conversation taped in circumstances similar to those in Blood could be used to 
impeach Fini’s testimony.71 In disallowing the use of the secretly taped 
conversation for impeachment purposes, the court emphasized the value of not 
permitting the prosecution to use the unconstitutionally-obtained conversation 
for any purpose: “Given the magnitude of the unconstitutional intrusion 
accomplished by electronic eavesdropping in and about a private home, . . . we 
conclude that half measures of deterrence are not enough.”72 
In 1989, in Commonwealth v. Panetti, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts extended Blood to apply to a crawl space underneath Panetti’s 
apartment.73 In Panetti, the police chief, sanctioned by the landlord to be in the 
crawl space, listened to Panetti negotiate illegal drug sales for more than two 
hours.74 The police chief used the eavesdropped conversations to obtain a 
warrant, which led to Panetti’s conviction. Panetti appealed the denial of his 
motion to suppress the overheard conversations.75 
The task of the Massachusetts court was to determine if Panetti’s claimed 
expectation of privacy was reasonable.76 The court distinguished an adjacent 
motel or hotel room or apartment from the Panetti crawl space: “Society should 
honor the privacy interests that apartment dwellers and condominium owners 
have in being free from warrantless eavesdropping by police who have 
infiltrated crawl spaces and other areas to which neither the public nor any other 
occupant of the multiple dwelling has access.”77 The court concluded that 
Panetti’s expectation of privacy was reasonable and the police chief’s 
                                                          
 69 Id. at 1038. 
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 71 Commonwealth v. Fini, 531 N.E.2d 570, 571 (Mass. 1988). 
 72 Id. at 573–74. 
 73 Commonwealth v. Panetti, 547 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Mass. 1989). 
 74 Id. at 46. 
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eavesdropping on over two hours of conversations did violate the search-and-
seizure provision of the Massachusetts Constitution.78 
In Commonwealth v. Price, undercover police officers arranged a sting 
operation in a local motel room in which Price offered to purchase a large 
quantity of marijuana.79 Massachusetts State troopers, who were in the adjoining 
motel room, secretly taped the transaction.80 The officers had previously 
obtained a search warrant, although not the type required by the Massachusetts 
statute regulating electronic surveillance.81 
Price challenged the admissibility of the taped conversations under the search-
and-seizure provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution and United States 
Constitution.82 Standing matters aside, the crucial question for the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts was whether Price had an expectation of privacy 
that was reasonable in the motel room in which the taped conversations 
transpired.83 The court determined that Price had an expectation of privacy, but 
the expectation was not reasonable.84 
The Massachusetts court distinguished the circumstances of the Price taping, 
in a motel room with strangers, from the secret taping in Blood, which occurred 
in private homes with known associates.85 In Blood, Blood previously knew the 
persons with whom he was meeting. Unlike Price, who had not previously met 
a number of the individuals at the meeting: “[Price] and his associates were 
engaged in negotiating a major business transaction with people whom he had 
just met, and whom his associates had first met the day before.”86 The location 
in Price was much different than the private homes in which the secretly taped 
conversations occurred in Blood.87 In Price, the location of the secretly taped 
conversations was “a motel room that was not registered in [Price’s] name, but 
rather in the name of someone about whom he knew almost nothing.”88 The 
Massachusetts court summarized Price’s activities: “He engaged in an arm’s 
length business negotiation with strangers in a place over which he had neither 
control nor a right to control and which had been selected by the strangers.”89 
Interestingly enough, Chief Justice Llacos, the author of the decision in Blood, 
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 79 Commonwealth v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 1355, 1356 (Mass. 1990). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1357. 
 82 Id. at 1357–58. 
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 84 Id. at 1358. 
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dissented from the Price decision.90 One concern was with the majority’s 
analysis of a suspect’s standing to enforce privacy rights under the 
Massachusetts Constitution: “The analysis adopted by the court . . . could be 
applied just as easily to deny standing to challenge secret videotapes of any 
number of legal activities undertaken by citizens of this Commonwealth each 
day.”91 Another concern of the dissent was that “the court’s opinion will 
encourage the police to engage in surreptitious videotaping without a warrant 
specifically authorizing such activity . . . thereby diminishing the privacy rights 
of the people of this Commonwealth.”92 
In Commonwealth v. Eason, two state troopers were investigating an 
apartment invasion.93 The informant was the woman with whom Eason had been 
living at the time of the incident.94 The troopers asked the informant to call 
Eason. The troopers were able to persuade her to call Eason.95 The informant 
reluctantly made two calls to Eason in his home, which the troopers listened to 
through a telephone extension and secretly taped.96 The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts decided that Eason’s claimed expectation of privacy was not 
reasonable under the search-and-seizure provision of the Massachusetts 
Constitution:97 “Any expectation of privacy in a telephone conversation is not 
objectively reasonable, because a person is not reasonably entitled to assume 
that no one is listening in on an extension telephone.”98 
In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, the United States Customs Service alerted 
the state police that it had detected a significant amount of cocaine in a package 
that had come from Colombia and was addressed to Pedro Tirado.99 After the 
package was delivered, police officers operating under a search warrant broke 
down Tirado’s door.100 Tirado claimed that the package belonged to Rodriguez 
who had offered Tirado $400 for Tirado to accept the package on Rodriguez’ 
behalf.101 Tirado telephoned Rodriguez as instructed, with a police officer 
listening to Tirado’s end of the conversation.102 By the time Rodriguez arrived 
to collect the package, a police officer had equipped Tirado with a hidden 
                                                          
 90 Id. at 1360. 
 91 Id. (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
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 93 Commonwealth v. Eason, 694 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (Mass. 1998). 
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 96 Commonwealth v. Eason, 681 N.E.2d 863, 864 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997), rev’d, 694 
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 97 Eason, 694 N.E.2d at 1268. 
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monitoring and taping device, which transmitted the conversation between 
Tirado and Rodriguez to Trooper Colon located in a vehicle outside Tirado’s 
apartment.103 
Rodriguez claimed that Trooper Colon’s trial testimony about the transmitted 
conversation between Tirado and Rodriguez violated the search-and-seizure 
provision of the Massachusetts Constitution.104 The Massachusetts court 
disagreed: “We determine that probable cause and exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless interception of the conversation, and there was thus no 
violation of art. 14.”105 The court explained “that the standards for an exigency 
are strict . . . and police cannot intentionally create exigencies to evade the 
warrant requirement.”106 The court opined that the officers acted appropriately 
as the events transpired quickly after their encounter with Tirado: “[T]he police 
acted reasonably in the course of their investigation and, given the unexpected 
turn of events, had no opportunity to obtain a warrant.”107 
D. Montana 
The Montana Constitution contains an explicit privacy provision, as well as a 
search-and- seizure provision.108 The Supreme Court of Montana has not been 
consistent in its interpretation of whether the Montana Constitution protects a 
suspect against being secretly taped. In 1978, in State v. Brackman,109 the court 
concluded that the Montana Constitution did protect a suspect from being 
secretly taped by an informant. However, in 1988, in State v. Brown, the court 
overruled Brackman. 110  Twenty years later, the Supreme Court of Montana 
overruled Brown in State v. Goetz.111 Four years later, the Supreme Court of 
Montana expanded its interpretation of the Montana Constitution to protect a 
telephone conversation from being secretly taped in State v. Allen.112 With Goetz 
and Allen, the Montana Constitution provides fairly broad protection for face-
to-face and telephone conversations.113 
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In 2008, in State v. Goetz, the Supreme Court of Montana considered the 
applicability of the Montana Constitution to an informant wearing a transmitter 
who allegedly purchased illegal drugs from Goetz in Goetz’s home while police 
detectives were secretly taping the conversation.114 The other case that was 
consolidated with Goetz involved Hamper as the suspect.115 An informant 
allegedly made two illegal drug purchases from Hamper, one in a vehicle in a 
parking lot and the other in Hamper’s home.116 During each of the alleged 
purchases, the informant was wearing a transmitter and detectives were secretly 
taping the conversation.117 
The Montana court found that the secretly taped conversations should have 
been suppressed because “[t]he electronic monitoring and recording of those 
conversations without a warrant or the existence of an established exception to 
the warrant requirement violated the Defendants’ rights under Article II, 
Sections 10 and 11.”118 In reaching this holding, the court first found that the 
defendants did have an expectation of privacy because each conversation 
occurred either in a home or in a vehicle removed from others.119 Then the court 
found that the expectation that the government would not be secretly recording 
in such locations was reasonable.120 The court found the third factor—if there is 
a compelling state interest for the secret taping—was inapplicable.121 
One concurring justice thought that protection under the Montana 
Constitution against informant secret taping should not be limited to a home or 
vehicle.122 A second justice concurred with the majority’s protection for a 
conversation occurring in the suspect’s home but dissented from providing 
protection for a conversation occurring inside a vehicle.123 A dissenting opinion 
stated that the secretly taped conversations should not be protected under the 
Montana Constitution because the subject matter of conversations was business 
and the transactions were with persons the suspects did not previously know: 
“The public and commercial nature of the criminal enterprise at issue here—the 
sale of illegal drugs to strangers—separates this case from other kinds of crimes, 
even drug-related. . . .”124 
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In 2010, in State v. Allen, the Supreme Court of Montana decided that the 
Montana Constitution should protect against an informant secretly taping cell-
phone conversations between the suspect and the informant.125 In reaching its 
decision, the Montana court employed the same three-step test used in Goetz.126 
The court found that Allen had an expectation of privacy in his cell-phone 
conversation under the circumstances. It ruled that society would recognize this 
expectation as reasonable based on the state’s constitutional convention, and 
there was no compelling state interest for the secret taping.127 
The concurring opinion would have extended the protection under the state 
constitution to the informant’s testimony about the secretly taped cell-phone 
conversation.128 The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part disagreed 
with the majority that the Montana Constitution mandated the suppression of the 
secretly taped cell phone conversation based on an interpretation of the history 
of the state constitutional convention that differed from that of the majority.129 
In 2012, in State v. Stewart, Stewart had allegedly been sexually molesting 
his daughter for eleven years.130 After the daughter turned eighteen, she reported 
the sexual molestation and began working with a local law enforcement 
detective.131 The detective secured a search warrant for the family home, where 
he gathered evidence, and spoke with an older brother who corroborated the 
daughter’s story.132 The detective persuaded the daughter to call her father on 
his cell phone, while he and her mother were traveling, from the home landline 
telephone to which the detective had connected monitoring and taping 
equipment.133 The detective secretly taped four calls between the daughter and 
father without obtaining a warrant.134 
State v. Allen was decided after Stewart was convicted, and Stewart filed a 
motion for a new trial based on the use of the secretly taped telephone 
conversations at trial.135 The court applied the three-step test and found that 
Stewart’s rights were violated under the Montana Constitution.136 The court 
concluded that the admission of the secretly taped telephone conversations was 
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harmless error.137 The parties characterized the taped information both as 
inculpatory and exculpatory, while Stewart’s attorney attempted to use the taped 
information to impeach the daughter at trial.138 The Montana court explained its 
rationale for its harmless error conclusion: “Qualitatively, nothing on the 
recordings is any more inflammatory or prejudicial than the other, admissible 
evidence at trial.”139 
E. North Dakota 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has interpreted the North Dakota 
Constitution to require only one-party consent to secretly tape a conversation 
between the suspect and the informant in the informant’s vehicle. 
In 2010, in State v. Loh, the suspect claimed that the search-and-seizure 
provision of the North Dakota Constitution should be interpreted to protect his 
conversations with an informant in the informant’s car from being transmitted 
and secretly taped by police officers monitoring the conversations.140 The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota stated, “We are not persuaded that our state 
constitution was violated by law enforcement’s warrantless electronic 
monitoring of Loh’s face-to-face conversations with the confidential informant 
when the conversations and drug transactions occurred in the informant’s car 
and the informant consented to the police’s electronic monitoring.”141 Loh 
suggested that the North Dakota court follow Montana’s lead in Goetz, in which 
the Supreme Court of Montana interpreted the Montana Constitution to protect 
a suspect against secret taping, but the North Dakota court declined to do so.142 
The North Dakota court noted that the Montana Constitution contains an explicit 
right to privacy and, while some states protect privacy similarly to the protection 
afforded by Montana, most states follow the U.S. Supreme Court in White.143 
F. Pennsylvania 
The Pennsylvania Constitution does not contain an explicit privacy provision, 
but in 1994, in Commonwealth v. Brion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
interpreted the search-and-seizure provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution to 
safeguard a conversation against electronic interception where an informant 
wearing a radio transmitter met with a suspect in the suspect’s home and 
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transmitted the conversation to police officers who were secretly recording.144 
Pennsylvania is an all-party consent state but, at the time Brion was decided, the 
eavesdropping statutes permitted secret taping, with the consent of one party, if 
an officer was a party to the conversation or a party to the conversation 
consented to the officer secretly taping the conversation.145 
The Pennsylvania court found that Brion differed from earlier cases because 
of “the sanctity of one’s home.”146 The court stated, “We hold that an individual 
can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home 
through the use of any electronic surveillance.”147 Thus, the search-and-seizure 
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution would require a warrant prior to 
secret taping in the suspect’s home.148 The court ruled that, because there was 
no indication that Brion’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable, the secretly 
taped conversation should have been suppressed.149 In addition, the court found 
that “there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.”150 
In Commonwealth v. Rekasie, the issue before the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania was whether the search-and-seizure provision of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution should be interpreted to require a probable cause determination by 
a judge prior to the police secretly taping a telephone conversation that an 
informant made from the police station to Rekasie in his home.151 Prior to the 
conversation, the Deputy Attorney General authorized the informant to permit 
his telephone conversations with Rekasie and others to be secretly taped, with 
the authorization done in accordance with the requirement of the Pennsylvania 
statute.152 The Pennsylvania court distinguished a face-to-face conversation 
from a telephone conversation: “A telephone call received by or placed to 
another is readily subject to numerous means of intrusion at the other end of the 
call, all without the knowledge of the individual on the call.”153 The court thus 
determined that a telephone conversation could be treated differently than a face-
to-face conversation: “Based upon these realities of telephonic 
                                                          
 144 Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287, 287 (Pa. 1994). 
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communication, . . . we hold that Rekasie did not harbor an expectation of 
privacy in his telephone conversation with Tubridy that society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable.”154 
The two dissenting opinions questioned that Rekasie should be decided 
differently from Brion, given that Rekasie was in his home when he spoke with 
the informant.155 The first dissenting opinion stated: “The majority has 
authorized the government to seize our words as spoken to another on a 
telephone in our own homes, requiring nothing more than a willing participant 
to place the call.”156 The second dissenting opinion saw the majority’s opinion 
as one step farther along a slippery slope: “Given the ever-increasing 
technological means for eavesdropping into private affairs, it appears, under the 
majority’s rationale, that it is only a matter of time before there is no privacy 
anywhere or in anything.”157 
In Commonwealth v. Dunnavent, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, being 
evenly divided, affirmed per curiam the lower court decisions.158 In Dunnavent, 
a confident informant wearing a hidden, soundless video device, was sent to 
make an illegal drug purchase from Dunnavent on a street corner.159 Dunnavent 
took the informant to Dunnavent’s home where the informant was invited inside, 
and the informant made the drug purchase.160 The trial court suppressed the 
videotape information, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed.161 
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, there were two opinions in support of 
affirmance and two opinions in support of reversal. The first opinion in support 
of affirmance acknowledged the argument for reversal was that “the confidential 
informant was not sent by the police into the home, but instead was unexpectedly 
invited into the home.”162 Therefore, “unless and until Brion is overruled, 
individuals in Appellee’s position are entitled to suppression of secretly made 
video recordings capturing events transpiring within the confines of their home, 
regardless of whether the police originally expected and/or intended that those 
events would occur outside the residence.”163 The second opinion in favor of 
affirmance emphasized the home location to be the “critical factor” in reaching 
a conclusion that the videotaping was a violation of the state constitution.164 In 
addition, “the nature of the government sanctioned activity at issue here—
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videotaping—to pose an even greater risk of unjustified invasion of the right of 
privacy than the audiotaping at issue in Brion.”165 
The first opinion in support of reversal found that “this case is properly 
controlled by . . . the deliberate nature of police conduct.”166 The opinion 
concluded that “given the exigent circumstances and given that there was no 
underlying unlawful governmental conduct, such as ‘sending’ a CI into a 
citizen’s home for the purpose of recording a conversation, no constitutional 
violation occurred.”167 The second opinion in support of reversal recognized that 
police officers should be on a par with suspects in the use of technology: “Just 
as the criminal element recognize the importance of and take advantage of 
technological advances, so must law enforcement be permitted to take advantage 
of technological advances in meeting its responsibilities under the law.”168 The 
dissenting justice would not have Brion control where there is an invitation by 
the suspect: “The expectation of privacy is lost when the suspect voluntarily 
exposes his illicit activities regardless of where it occurs and regardless if the 
police deliberately sent the informant to the home or not.”169 
G. Vermont 
Vermont is the sole state without an eavesdropping or wiretapping statute, 
and the Vermont Constitution does not contain an explicit right to privacy. The 
Vermont case that was most like Glass, Blood, and Brion was State v. Blow.170 
In 1991, in Blow, an informant volunteered to wear a radio transmitter and 
purchase illegal drugs from Blow in Blow’s home.171 On the two occasions, on 
which the informant completed the purchase in Blow’s home, a police detective 
monitored the radio transmissions and secretly taped the conversations.172 
Blow claimed that the secret taping violated the search-and-seizure provision 
of the Vermont Constitution.173 In analyzing Blow’s claim, the Supreme Court 
of Vermont employed the Katz two-step reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.174 The Vermont court agreed with Blow and held “that warrantless 
electronic participant monitoring conducted in a home offends the core values 
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of Article 11 [the search-and-seizure provision of the Vermont Constitution].”175 
The court added: “Accordingly, where the State uses an agent to enter a home 
for the purposes of eliciting and electronically transmitting evidence from an 
occupant of the home, it is the burden of the State to obtain a warrant upon 
probable cause prior to conducting that search.”176 
In 1991, in State v. Brooks, the Supreme Court of Vermont distinguished 
Brooks from Blow because the secretly taped conversation in Brooks occurred 
in a parking lot rather than in the suspect’s home.177 In Brooks, an informant 
agreed to cooperate with the police after being arrested.178 The informant called 
Brooks when Brooks was in his home, and they agreed to meet in a shopping 
center parking lot.179 During the telephone conversation, Brooks expressed some 
suspicion that the telephone call might be secretly taped, which it was.180 In the 
parking lot, Brooks and the informant remained in their vehicles as they spoke 
through open windows.181 The informant used a hidden radio transmitter to 
convey the conversation to police officers taping the conversation a short 
distance away in another vehicle.182 Brooks incriminated himself in the 
discussion, and the police used that information to obtain a search warrant for 
Brooks’ home and vehicle.183 
The Supreme Court of Vermont used the Katz two-step test in reviewing the 
trial court’s denial of Brooks’ motion to suppress the secretly taped 
conversations.184 The Vermont court of last resort found that Brooks’ claimed 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable: “Applying these guidelines to the 
facts of this case, we find that defendant, regardless of what he actually expected, 
did not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public parking lot. In that 
setting, conversations are subject to the eyes and ears of passersby.”185 The court 
added, “The distinction between the reasonable expectation of privacy within 
the home and outside of it is well-grounded in the law and in our culture.”186 The 
court recognized that the use of informants was an undesirable one: “The 
widespread and unrestricted use of government informants is surely one of the 
basic characteristics of a totalitarian state.”187 However, the court accepted the 
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use of informants as the price of safeguarding society.188 
The dissent in Brooks was three times as long as the majority opinion.189 The 
most salient point of the dissent drew attention to the fact that Brooks was 
originally in his home for the telephone conversation.190 The police could use 
the Brooks decision to lure the suspect outside the home and then secretly record 
an incriminating conversation without the bother of obtaining a warrant.191 
Justice Morse expresses in his dissent: “It is no small irony that the suspect in 
this case was coaxed from his house by a telephone call to meet and talk in a 
shopping center parking lot. The police may now monitor without limitation the 
words of any person it considers suspect, dangerous, undesirable, or 
unpopular.”192 
In 2002 in State v. Geraw, the Supreme Court of Vermont interpreted the 
search-and- seizure provision of the Vermont Constitution to protect a 
conversation in Geraw’s home from being secretly recorded by two officers.193 
In finding that Geraw’s secretly taped conversation was correctly suppressed, 
the Vermont court rejected the State’s argument that the fact that Geraw knew 
he was speaking with police officers lowered Geraw’s expectation of privacy.194 
Knowingly speaking with police officers “is a far different expectation, 
however, from knowingly exposing every word and phrase one speaks, every 
inflection or laugh or aside one utters, to the scrutiny of the world at large.”195 
The court emphasized that there was an underhanded reason that the officers 
failed to disclose that the conversation was being taped.196 
The lengthy dissent distinguished Geraw from Blow because Geraw invited 
the persons he knew to be officers into his home when he knew that they were 
investigating Geraw’s involvement in the serious criminal offense of child 
sexual molestation:197 “Vermonters would not find reasonable a suspect’s 
expectations that his responses to police questions about possible involvement 
in a crime are private.”198 
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H. West Virginia 
The West Virginia Constitution does not contain an explicit privacy 
provision, but in 2007, in State v. Mullens,199 the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia interpreted the search-and-seizure provision of the West Virginia 
Constitution to safeguard a conversation against electronic interception where 
an informant wearing a device with audio-and-video capability met with a 
suspect, and the suspect’s wife, in the suspect’s home and secretly taped their 
conversation. In doing so, the court overruled a prior 1986 decision.200 In 
Mullens, the court recognized its “long history of protecting the sanctity of the 
home from warrantless searches and seizures.”201 The state legislation 
permitting secret taping through one-party consent would still apply outside the 
home: “Our ruling today merely limits the one-party consent provision of the 
Act from being used to send an informant into the home of a suspect to record 
communications therein without having obtained a search warrant authorizing 
such conduct.”202 
Two justices dissented from Mullens and each wrote a separate dissenting 
opinion.203 Justice Benjamin was troubled by the majority overruling its prior 
opinion in State v. Thompson without what the justice thought to be adequate 
reasoning.204 Justice Benjamin pointed out that the recording equipment used in 
Mullens was not in any way sophisticated, but the advantage of recording a 
conversation is that it produces reliable evidence for use in a criminal case, and 
the informant was invited into the Mullens home.205 In his dissent, Justice 
Maynard also criticized the majority’s decision for less than “sound 
reasoning.”206 He observed that, under the court’s ruling, an informant can enter 
the suspect’s home and gather evidence by taking notes of a conversation with 
the suspect; however, an informant is precluded from secretly taping that same 
conversation, with “the likely effect . . . to make legitimate police investigations 
of criminal suspects more time-consuming, complex, and difficult.”207 
In response to Mullens, the West Virginia Legislature passed the Electronic 
Interception of Person’s Conduct or Oral Communications in the Home by Law 
Enforcement Act (the “Electronic Interception Act”).208 The Electronic 
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Interception Act generally requires law enforcement to obtain a court order prior 
to secretly taping a suspect in the suspect’s home, but law enforcement can 
obtain a retroactive court order if there are exigent circumstances.209 
In 2014, in State ex rel State v. Burnside, the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia had the occasion to review the portion of the West Virginia statute 
that protects an attorney-client conversation against being secretly taped.210 In 
Burnside, a confidential informant drove Hardison from his home to his law 
office where the informant allegedly purchased cocaine from the attorney.211 
The informant secretly taped their conversations in the informant’s vehicle and 
in Hardison’s law office. At the time, the informant was an acquaintance and 
client of Hardison.212 The trial court suppressed the secretly taped conversations 
because they were considered attorney-client communication.213 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the 
statute “is intended to prevent attorney-client privileged communications from 
being monitored by wiretapping or through electronic surveillance.”214 The West 
Virginia court found that “Lawyer Hardison was not acting in his capacity as a 
lawyer during his April 6, 2012, conversation with the confidential 
informant.”215 The court concluded in Burnside that the secretly taped 
conversations between the informant and the suspect should not have been 
suppressed.216 The court added: “The confidential informant was not seeking 
legal advice from Lawyer Hardison; he was allegedly only seeking to purchase 
cocaine from him. Further, the confidential informant, having agreed to wear a 
recording device, did not intend that this conversation be kept confidential.”217 
Burnside garnered two concurring opinions and a dissenting opinion.218 Both 
concurring opinions supported the conclusion that the majority opinion struck 
the proper balance of safeguarding the attorney-client privilege and protecting 
the public against criminal activity.219 The dissent was more protective of law-
office conversation: “In permitting electronically intercepted non attorney-client 
communications emanating from a law office of any attorney licensed to practice 
law in this state, the majority has placed the sanctity of the attorney-client 
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relationship on a dangerous slope.”220 
In 2020, in State v. Howells, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
considered the exigent circumstances exception.221 Two undercover detectives 
looking for a confidential informant found out that the informant was staying at 
Howells’ home.222 They knocked at Howells’ front door inquiring about the 
informant and indicating that the informant was their usual illegal drug 
supplier.223 While speaking on the front porch, Howells offered to sell them 
drugs if they could return a little later.224 The detectives returned a short while 
later after one of the detectives equipped himself with a hidden taping device.225 
The detectives returned, Howells invited them into his home, and the detectives 
purchased drugs from Howells.226 One of the detectives obtained a retroactive 
court order prior to their next meeting with Howells in a shopping center parking 
lot.227 The detectives purchased drugs from Howells while they were in Howells’ 
vehicle in the parking lot.228 Both the second meeting in Howells’ home and the 
meeting in his vehicle were secretly taped.229 On appeal, Howells claimed that 
the conversation and other evidence relating to it should have been suppressed 
because the conversation was secretly taped without a court order.230 
The West Virginia court found that the sequence of events did amount to 
exigent circumstances: “The Detectives believed that the drug transaction would 
occur on [Howells’] porch and therefore they did not initially seek a court order 
to wear the audio/video recorder.”231 Then the circumstances quickly changed: 
“Once [Howells] invited the Detectives into his home, it was simply not practical 
for them to abruptly tell [Howells] they had to go, but they would be back.”232 
One justice dissented, pointing out that the serious deficiencies in the court 
order did not comply with the statutory requirements for a retroactive court 
order.233 The dissent opined that the detectives should have dispensed with 
secretly taping the in-home drug purchase, and they could have still testified 
concerning the event.234 The dissent concluded that the majority’s “strained 
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analysis has cast a troubling cloud over our citizens’ right to be free of unlawful 
interception of their in-home communications.”235 
I. Wyoming 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has interpreted the Wyoming Constitution 
to require only one-party consent to secretly tape a conversation between the 
suspect, an undercover agent, and informants in the suspect’s home.236 
In 1999, in Almada v. State, Almada was allegedly selling cocaine when he 
invited an undercover agent, two informants, and a buyer into his home.237 The 
agent and one of the informants were wearing hidden devices with taping and 
transmitting capability and after the agent made a purchase, Almada was 
arrested.238 Almada claimed that the secretly taped conversation should have 
been suppressed.239 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming first considered Almada’s claims that a law 
enforcement officer could not qualify as a participant who could consent to the 
secret taping and that a court order is required.240 The Wyoming court held that 
a law enforcement officer may provide the one-party consent necessary and, 
with the one-party consent, a court order is not required.241 
Next the court considered whether the Wyoming eavesdropping statutes 
violated the search-and-seizure provision of the Wyoming Constitution.242 The 
court decided, “We hold participant monitoring without a warrant or court order 
pursuant to the Act does not violate Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming [Constitution,]” 
finding that “Almada had no reasonable expectation of privacy which might 
implicate constitutional protection in this case.”243 The court reasoned, “The 
comprehensive nature of the Act and its many safeguards couched in 
constitutional terms suggest that compliance with the Act weighs heavily in 
favor of finding the interception constitutional on independent state grounds.”244 
The court added, “The significant limitations placed on the interception of 
communications by peace officers clearly signifies a legislative intent to draw a 
balance between the interest of the state in protecting its citizens from crime and 
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its interest in preserving individual freedom from overly intrusive governmental 
invasion.”245 
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROVISIONS AND STATE 
STATUTES 
The preceding section explained that case law in six states protects the suspect 
from being secretly taped in the suspect’s home where the taping was facilitated 
by an informant who spoke to the suspect while in the suspect’s home. Only 
Alaska and Montana drew this protection from an explicit privacy provision in 
the state constitution. Courts in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
and Vermont interpreted a state constitutional search-and-seizure provision to 
provide this protection against secret taping in the home. Of the six states, 
Massachusetts, Montana, and Pennsylvania are all-party consent states.246 
Dozens of state constitutions contain explicit privacy provisions.247 These 
states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, and Washington.248 The 
state constitutions of California, Florida, and Hawaii each have two explicit 
privacy references, with one found in the search-and-seizure provision and the 
other in a separate privacy provision.249 New York limits its constitutional 
privacy protection to telephone conversations.250 
The existence of an explicit privacy provision in a state constitution does not 
necessarily correspond to the statutes for the state providing more protection 
against a conversation being secretly taped. Some states with an explicit 
constitutional privacy provision also protect against secret taping by requiring 
all-party consent, while some states do not. 
Generally, state statutes follow one of two patterns for protecting a 
conversation against secret taping. The majority of the states and the federal 
statute require one-party consent.251 The states requiring only one-party consent 
are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut (limited to a 
face-to-face conversation), District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada (limited to a face-to-face conversation), New 
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Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon (limited to telephone conversation), Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. A minority of the states require all-party consent.252 
These states are California,253 Connecticut (limited to telephone conversation), 
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, 
Nevada (limited to telephone conversation), New Hampshire, Oregon (limited 
to face-to-face conversation), Pennsylvania, and Washington.254 
Thus, when one compares the existence of an explicit constitutional privacy 
provision with the state statutes, one finds little correlation. California, Florida, 
Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, and Washington are the six states that have 
both an explicit constitutional privacy provision and all-party consent statutes. 
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana, New York, and South Carolina are the six 
states that have an explicit constitutional privacy provision and one-party 
consent statutes.255 
Various factors may be used to compare different state statutes providing 
protection against secret taping.256 One factor described above is the amount of 
consent required to tape a conversation, with some states requiring one-party 
consent and other states requiring all-party consent. Many state statutes contain 
some type of exception permitting someone operating under color of law, such 
as a police officer, to tape a conversation with one-party consent, although as 
explained below, this exception varies widely. The language of statutes in a 
number of states borrows from the language of the federal statutes, which a court 
may find helpful in interpreting a state statute. Most states make violation of the 
state statute a crime that entails a term of imprisonment and the possibility of a 
fine.257 The severity of the punishment varies widely from state to state.258 Many 
states provide a private right of action to a person whose conversation was 
illegally taped. The person may be entitled to statutory damages, punitive 
damages, attorney fees, costs, injunction, and declaratory relief, depending on 
the state. The amount awardable in statutory damages varies widely from state 
to state.259 
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The federal act, often referred to as the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act,260 requires one-party consent to secretly tape a conversation unless the 
purpose of taping the conversation is to commit a crime or tort.261 A number of 
one-party consent states have this same exception that would not permit secret 
taping on one-party consent if the purpose of taping the conversation is to 
commit a crime or tort. These states include: Delaware,262 District of 
Columbia,263 Hawaii,264 Idaho (limited to a crime),265 Iowa,266 Louisiana,267 
Minnesota,268 Mississippi,269 Missouri,270 Nebraska,271 New Jersey,272 North 
Dakota (limited to a crime or “unlawful harm”),273 Ohio,274 Oklahoma (limited 
to a crime),275 Rhode Island,276 Tennessee,277 Texas (limited to an “unlawful 
act”),278 Utah,279 West Virginia,280 Wisconsin,281 and Wyoming.282 
The federal act contains the typical color of law exemption permitting a police 
officer to secretly tape a conversation where the officer is a party to the 
conversation or a party to the conversation has given consent to have the 
conversation secretly taped.283 Because the federal act serves as a model, statutes 
of a number of states contain a similar provision, such as: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
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Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. The Montana color of law exception is quite broad 
in permitting a public official to tape when performing official duties.284 The 
statutes of several states have no color of law exception, including: Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, New York, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. As explained below, the color of law exception is limited in certain 
states, including California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia. 
California is a state whose color of law exception is limited to certain 
enumerated crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving 
violence against the person, including, but not limited to, human trafficking, 
domestic violence, or an emergency situation that involves the taking of a 
hostage or the barricading of a location.285 In addition, an exception exists for a 
university police officer investigating a sexual offense.286 
Illinois limits its color of law exception to patrol cars, taser use, a hostage or 
barricade situation,287 or a kidnapping, hostage, or barricade situation with 
associated danger of death or great bodily harm.288 
Maryland limits its color of law exception to the following offenses or 
solicitation or conspiracy to commit the following offenses: murder, kidnapping, 
rape, a sexual offense in the first or second degree, child abuse in the first or 
second degree, child pornography, gambling, robbery, arson, bribery, extortion, 
dealing in a controlled dangerous substance, a fraudulent insurance act, an 
offense relating to destructive devices, a human trafficking offense, sexual 
solicitation of a minor, an offense relating to obstructing justice, sexual abuse of 
a minor, a theft scheme involving at least $10,000, abuse or neglect of a 
vulnerable adult, an offense relating to Medicaid fraud, an offense involving a 
firearm, or a barricade situation with a hostage.289 
Massachusetts limits its color of law exception to a situation necessary to 
ensure the safety of an undercover officer or agent.290 
Nevada limits its color of law exception to a situation involving a barricade, 
hostage, or explosive,291 or an emergency situation with the consent of one 
party.292 
New Hampshire limits its color of law exception to an officer carrying a radio 
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transmitter when investigating any of the following offenses or a conspiracy to 
commit any of the following offenses: homicide, kidnapping, gambling, theft, 
corrupt practices, child sexual abuse images, computer pornography and child 
exploitation, criminal conduct in violation of the securities law, criminal conduct 
in violation of the security takeover disclosure laws, robbery, hindering 
apprehension or prosecution, tampering with witnesses and informants, 
aggravated felonious sexual assault, felonious sexual assault, escape, bail 
jumping, insurance fraud, dealing in narcotic drugs, marijuana, or other 
dangerous drugs, or hazardous waste violations.293 
Oregon limits its color of law exception to an officer investigating a felony 
involving controlled substances; manufacture or delivery of certain drugs, or 
delivery of a controlled substance to a minor; or a misdemeanor involving 
prostitution or commercial sexual solicitation; a felony involving exigent 
circumstances under which it is not reasonable to be able to obtain a court 
order;294 or an officer recording an incident using a police vehicle, a body 
camera, or an audio-equipped taser.295 
Pennsylvania limits its color of law exception to an officer wearing a 
recording device or radio transmitter meeting with a suspect to investigate harm 
done to an officer, or to an officer investigating a barricade or hostage 
situation.296 
Washington limits its color of law exception to an officer investigating threats 
of extortion, blackmail, bodily harm, or other unlawful requests or demands or 
a barricade or hostage situation when one party to the conversation consents.297 
In addition, a conversation concerning controlled substances or sexual abuse of 
a minor may be secretly taped on consent of one party to protect the safety of 
the consenting party.298 
The color of law exception in West Virginia is limited to exigent 
circumstances concerning taping in a home with a court order required within 
three business days thereafter.299 
IV. ALL-PARTY CONSENT 
At first blush, one would think that it would be better for a state to provide 
more privacy protection by requiring all-party consent rather than one-party 
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consent. As alluded to earlier, there may be good reasons for secretly taping a 
conversation to gather evidence. One who does so in an all-party consent state 
can be subject to serious criminal penalties.300 With the endless availability of 
recording capability on one’s cell phone, someone may innocently capture a 
conversation without knowing that secret taping is a crime in the particular state. 
One is well aware of certain actions that are criminal in nature; however, taping 
a conversation without asking for all parties to consent may not obviously be 
illegal to most people, especially because only a minority of states make the 
action criminal.301 States are inconsistent in requiring one-party or all-party 
consent, and one who travels may be subject to varying requirements as one 
passes from state to state. In addition, the location of a party speaking on a cell 
phone may be unclear or unknown, and a question may arise as to what state’s 
law should apply if the cell phone conversation is interstate between one party 
in a one-party consent state and the other party in an all-party consent state. 
The potential problems with requiring all-party consent have caused all-party 
states to interpret their statutes in a variety of ways, with a lack of consistency 
from state to state. 
A. California 
California’s protections against wiretapping requires all-party consent for 
cellular telephone conversations.302 California permits one-party consent to 
secretly tape a conversation where the conversation is related to certain 
enumerated crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving 
violence against the person, including, but not limited to, human trafficking, or 
domestic violence.303 Statutory protection for face-to-face and other types of 
telephone conversations has seriously been cut back by the repeal of certain 
statutes and courts holding other statutes unconstitutional.304 
B. Florida 
Florida is an all-party consent state, meaning that it is illegal for a party to a 
face-to-face conversation or a telephone conversation to secretly tape the 
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conversation.305 The distinction between a face-to-face conversation protected 
against being taped and a telephone conversation being protected against being 
taped is that the face-to-face conversation must be one in which the participants 
expect privacy and the expectation of privacy is reasonable.306 A telephone 
conversation is protected without any requirement of reasonableness.307 
In State v. Inciarrano,308 the Florida Supreme Court had difficulty deciding 
the case because the murder victim secretly taped a face-to-face conversation 
with the murderer in the victim’s office, a secluded location, and the 
conversation was the best and only evidence of the crime.309 In Inciarrano, the 
murder victim had a tape recorder hidden in his desk that was secretly taping the 
meeting between the victim and Inciarrano.310 The tape captured the sounds of 
Inciarrano allegedly shooting and killing the victim.311 The issue before the 
Florida court was “whether the tape recording made by a victim of his own 
murder must be excluded from evidence pursuant to chapter 934.”312 
The Florida court held “that because Inciarrano had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the exclusionary rule of section 934.06 does not apply.”313 The 
reasoning of the court was that Inciarrano’s expectation of privacy was not 
reasonable because “Inciarrano went to the victim’s office with the intent to do 
him harm.”314 The trial court perhaps provided clearer reasoning: “[T]he Court 
considered, among other factors, the quasi-public nature of the premises within 
which the conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of 
the premises to bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of 
the microphone used to record the conversations. . . .”315 
The Florida Supreme Court decided McDade v. State in 2014.316 McDade was 
an extremely difficult case, in that the defendant allegedly sexually abused his 
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sixteen-year-old stepdaughter for six years, and she secretly taped two 
conversations when they were in his bedroom.317 The police arrested McDade 
after the stepdaughter turned the secretly taped conversations over to the 
police.318 The trial court denied McDade’s motion to suppress, and he was 
convicted; the intermediate appellate court affirmed.319 
The Florida court stated the issue as: “[does] a recording of a solicitation and 
confirmation of child sexual abuse [secretly] made by the child victim in the 
accused’s bedroom fall within. . . [§] 934 [of the 2010] Florida statutes?”320 The 
Florida court concluded that the secretly taped conversations qualified as oral 
communication, which was protected against being secretly taped, and the 
conversations were inadmissible.321 The court factually distinguished 
Inciarrano and McDade on the facts.322 The location in Inciarrano was the 
murder victim’s place of business, which was open to the public:323 “Conversely, 
the recordings at issue in this case were made in McDade’s bedroom, the 
recording device was hidden under the stepdaughter’s shirt, and the recordings 
contain conversations between McDade and his stepdaughter.”324 
In McDade, the Florida Supreme Court invited the Florida legislature to 
permit secret taping by one of the parties to a conversation to provide evidence 
of a crime.325 The Florida legislature accepted the invitation and added an 
extremely narrow exception to the all-party consent requirement.326 Florida now 
permits one-party consent for a minor to secretly tape a face-to-face 
conversation where the conversation is related to an unlawful sexual act or 
violence.327 
Florida does have a color of law exception that would permit a party to a 
conversation to secretly tape the conversation, but only if “under the direction 
of an investigative or law enforcement officer” and only if “the purpose of such 
interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act.”328 In 2017, in Tundidor v. 
State, the Florida Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether the 
exception applied.329 In Tundidor, the police were investigating Randy Tundidor 
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and his son, Junior, for murder and several other crimes that they allegedly 
committed.330 The police contacted Tundidor’s other son, Shawn.331 Shawn, 
who was afraid that he might be implicated, asked the police to let him secretly 
tape a conversation with his father.332 Shawn did so using recording equipment 
the police provided and captured his father incriminating himself.333 The Florida 
court concluded that the requirements of the color of law exception were met:334 
The court found that “because the police agreed to Shawn’s suggestion of 
recording his conversation with his father and helped him to do so by providing 
the recording equipment and transportation, the recording was made under the 
direction of the police . . . “335 
C. Illinois 
Illinois makes it legal to tape a private conversation with all-party consent.336 
Illinois permits one-party consent to secretly tape a conversation where the 
conversation is related to a crime against the person or immediate household.337 
D. Maryland 
Maryland makes it legal to tape a conversation with all-party consent unless 
the taping is a crime or tort.338 
In 2000, in Deibler v. State, Deibler had allegedly used a hidden camera with 
audio capability to secretly record his friend’s aunt taking a shower.339 The 
Maryland Wiretap Law makes it illegal to willfully tape a conversation.340 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland was tasked with statutory interpretation:341“[t]he 
question is whether willfulness, for purposes of § 10–402(a)(1), requires 
knowledge on the part of the defendant that his or her action is unlawful—that 
it is prohibited by the statute.”342 The Maryland court held that, for purposes of 
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the Maryland Wiretap Law, “an interception that is not otherwise specifically 
authorized is done willfully if it is done intentionally-purposely.”343 The dissent 
would have interpreted the Maryland Wiretap Law to require the suspect to 
know that the suspect’s action was illegal,344 stating “although Deibler’s conduct 
was morally reprehensible, the record of his trial fails to provide evidence of the 
degree of willfulness required under Maryland’s wiretap statute. . . .”345 
In 2018, in Agnew v. State, Agnew tried to make offensive use of the all-party 
consent statute, claiming that the cell phone conversation he secretly taped could 
not be used as evidence against him because the other party to the telephone 
conversation did not consent to the taping.346 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
concluded that the telephone conversation was properly admitted because his 
claimed expectation of privacy was not reasonable.347 The Maryland court 
reasoned: “It would be . . . ludicrous to conclude that the purpose of the Wiretap 
Act extended to protect a party who records their own conversation without the 
consent of the other party, and then seeks to block its admission due to the 
intentional failure to obtain the other person’s consent.”348 
E. Massachusetts 
By its terms, the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute would apply to 
criminalize the recording if it were made secretly, perhaps with the recording 
device hidden, without all-party consent.349 
On occasion, a private citizen has taken to recording police officers 
performing their official duties.350 In 2018, in Martin v. Gross, individuals 
seeking to make such secret recordings challenged the Massachusetts statute as 
being in violation of their First Amendment rights.351 The court agreed with the 
challenge, holding “that Section 99 [the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute] 
may not constitutionally prohibit the secret audio recording of government 
officials, including law enforcement officials, performing their duties in public 
spaces, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.”352 
                                                          
 343 Deibler, 776 A.2d at 665. 
 344 Id. at 667–68 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
 345 Id. at 668. 
 346 Agnew v. State, 197 A.3d 27, 28–30 (Md. 2018). 
 347 Id. at 35. 
 348 Id. at 34. 
 349 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 272 § 99(B)(4), (C)(1) (West 2020). 
 350 Martin v. Gross, 340 F. Supp. 3d 87, 94 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 351 Id. at 93. 
 352 Id. at 109. 
2020] Privacy, Eavesdropping, and Wiretapping 41 
F. Michigan 
Michigan protects a private conversation from being taped without all-party 
consent.353 
In 1982, in Sullivan v. Gray, the Court of Appeals of Michigan provided a 
unique interpretation of the state’s eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes. 354 
The Michigan intermediate appellate court considered “whether participant 
recording is forbidden” even though the Michigan statutes require all-party 
consent to tape a conversation.355 The court stated: “We believe the statutory 
language, on its face, unambiguously excludes participant recording from the 
definition of eavesdropping by limiting the subject conversation to ‘the private 
discourse of others.’”356 The court acknowledged that the interpretation 
produces an anomalous result in that a participant may freely and secretly tape 
a conversation, but a non-participant may not tape the same conversation without 
consent of all parties.357 The court explained that a participant may always take 
notes regarding the conversation, putting the participant in the best position to 
evaluate what another participant may reveal to others about the private:358 “The 
individual may gauge his expectations according to his own evaluation of the 
person to whom he speaks. He has the ability to limit what he says based upon 
that expectation.”359 In contrast, not all of the participants may be acquainted 
with an outsider: “When a third party is unilaterally given permission to listen 
in upon a conversation, unknown to other participants, those other participants 
are no longer able to evaluate and form accurate expectations since they are 
without knowledge of the third party.”360 
The Sullivan dissent disagreed with the statutory interpretation provided in 
the majority opinion and then provided reasons why all-party consent should be 
required in Michigan:361 “There is obviously more credence given to a tape 
                                                          
 353 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.539c (West 2020). 
 354 Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). It is interesting to note that 
the Supreme Court of Michigan has not cited to Sullivan even though the intermediate 
appellate interpretation of the Michigan statutes is unique in interpreting the consent 
requirement in the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes to apply to non-participant, rather 
than to participant taping. The Supreme Court of Michigan did state that it was leaving open 
the question of whether the intermediate appellate court correctly interpreted the Michigan 
eavesdropping statute. Dickerson v. Raphael, 461 Mich. 851, 851 (1999). Although not 
unheard of, Sullivan was decided almost forty years ago and the Supreme Court of Michigan 
has yet to provide a different interpretation of the statute. 
 355 Sullivan, 324 N.W.2d at 59. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. at 60. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. at 61–62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
42 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
recording than a verbal recollection. . . . Violations of these restrictive statutes 
should carry strict and serious penalties so as to discourage future use.”362 The 
dissent added: “I cannot repeat enough for emphasis that there has been a deluge 
of sophisticated electronic listening equipment within the last two decades that 
threatens all privacy.”363 
In 1999, in Dickerson v. Raphael, the Supreme Court of Michigan considered 
the correct measure to be used when determining if a conversation is private 
under the Michigan eavesdropping statutes.364 The facts were described in the 
opinion of the intermediate appellate court.365 Dickerson’s daughter contacted 
the Sally Jessy Raphael television show about her desire to have a conversation 
with her mother, regarding her mother’s membership in the Church of 
Scientology, to later be rebroadcasted on national television.366 The show 
producer had the daughter fitted with a device that could transmit audio and 
video of the conversation to be secretly taped in a nearby van.367 The daughter, 
the daughter’s husband, and Dickerson’s son spoke with Dickerson in a public 
park while the conversation was secretly videotaped.368 Portions of the 
conversation were later broadcast on national television.369 Dickerson sued 
claiming that the secret taping violated the Michigan eavesdropping statutes.370 
The Supreme Court of Michigan found that the trial court’s jury instruction to 
determine if the conversation qualified as a private conversation under the 
Michigan eavesdropping statutes was not correct.371 The Court stated that, “[t]he 
proper question is whether plaintiff intended and reasonably expected that the 
conversation was private, not whether the subject matter was intended to be 
private.”372 
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided People v. Stone, in which 
an estranged husband was charged with using a scanner to eavesdrop on his 
wife’s cordless telephone conversations.373 The issue before the court was 
whether the wife’s conversations qualified as “private conversation” protected 
against being secretly taped.374 The court held “that, although current technology 
                                                          
 362 Id. at 62. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Dickerson v. Raphael, 461 Mich. 851, 851 (Mich. 1999). 
 365 Id., reversing in part Dickerson v. Raphael, 654 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
 366 Dickerson, 564 N.W.2d at 87, rev’d in part, 461 Mich. 851 (Mich. 1999). 
 367 Id. at 87–88 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. at 88. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Dickerson, 461 Mich. at 851 (Mich. 1999). 
 372 Id. 
 373 People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Mich. 2001). 
 374 Id. 
2020] Privacy, Eavesdropping, and Wiretapping 43 
may allow cordless telephone conversations to be intercepted, such 
conversations nonetheless can be private conversations under the eavesdropping 
statutes.”375 The court reasoned that “although the victim may have known that 
her cordless telephone conversations could be willfully intercepted with a 
device, she also could presume that others would not eavesdrop on her cordless 
telephone conversations using any device because doing so is a felony under the 
eavesdropping statutes.”376 
In 2011, in Bowens v. Ary, Inc., the Supreme Court of Michigan had to 
determine whether plaintiffs’ conversation with defendants that defendants 
taped qualified as a private conversation under the Michigan eavesdropping 
statute.377 The Michigan court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claimed expectation 
of privacy was not reasonable based on the circumstances.378 
The following evidence compels this conclusion: (1) the general 
locale of the meeting was the backstage of the Joe Louis arena during 
the hectic hours preceding a high-profile concert, where over 400 
people, including national and local media, had backstage passes; (2) 
the concert-promoter defendants were not receptive to the public-
official plaintiffs’ requests and, by all accounts, the parties’ 
relationship was antagonistic; (3) the room in which plaintiffs chose 
to converse served as defendants’ operational headquarters with 
security personnel connected to defendants controlling the open 
doors; (4) there were at least nine identified people in the room, plus 
unidentified others who were free to come and go from the room, and 
listen to the conversation, as they pleased; (5) plaintiffs were aware 
that there were multiple camera crews in the vicinity, including a 
crew from MTV and a crew specifically hired by defendants to 
record backstage matters of interest; (6) and video evidence shows 
one person visibly filming in the room where the conversation took 
place while plaintiffs were present, thereby establishing that at least 
one cameraman was openly and obviously filming during the course 
of what plaintiffs have characterized as a “private conversation.”379 
The dissent opined that the facts were not as clear as the majority made them 
out to be, of which several of the six factors listed by the majority are not 
determinative as to whether the plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy was 
reasonable, and that the majority should not have decided a factual question as 
a question of law.380 
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G. Montana 
The Montana all-party consent statute is comparatively brief and contains no 
one-party consent exception.381 
H. Nevada 
Nevada, through case-law interpretation of the Nevada statutes, protects a 
telephone conversation from being taped without all-party consent and requires 
one-party consent to secretly tape a private conversation.382 The Nevada statute 
permits one-party consent to secretly tape a telephone conversation in the 
extremely limited circumstance when there is an emergency and a court order 
cannot be obtained, although the court order must be applied for within seventy-
two hours.383 
In 1998, in Lane v. Allstate Insurance Co., a plurality of the Supreme Court 
of Nevada interpreted the statute to mean that secretly taping a telephone 
conversation based on only one-party consent is illegal.384 Another opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part agreed that the statute should be 
interpreted to mean that secretly taping a telephone conversation on one-party 
consent is illegal.385 One dissenting opinion argued that Lane did not do anything 
unlawful in taping telephone conversations in which he was a participant.386 A 
second dissenting opinion pointed out that the state statutes were ambiguous as 
judged by the varying interpretation of the statutes by the judges and justices 
that considered Lane.387 The author of that opinion would interpret § 200.620 to 
apply only to law enforcement, making Lane’s secret taping of the telephone 
conversations legal.388 
The wording of § 200.620 remained unchanged, and the Supreme Court of 
Nevada did not have occasion to reconsider the statute until nineteen years 
later.389 In 2017, at the beginning of the opinion in Ditech Financial LLC v. 
Buckles, the Supreme Court of Nevada stated, “NRS 200.620 prohibits a person 
from recording a telephone call unless both parties participating in the call 
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consent to the recording.”390 The Nevada court then quickly moved on to decide 
that the statute did not apply in Ditech because the location of the taping was 
outside Nevada.391 
I. Oregon 
Oregon requires all party consent to tape a face-to-face conversation, permits 
secret taping of a telephone conversation on one-party consent, and has a limited 
color of law exception.392 In case law, the eavesdropping and wiretapping 
statutes have been applied fairly strictly. 
In 1996, in State v. Carston,393 a private citizen used a scanner to overhear a 
cordless telephone conversation discussing an illegal drug transaction. The 
citizen called the local police department and provided information from the 
overheard conversation that the police used to locate the suspects.394 The trial 
court agreed with the suspects that all of the information should be suppressed 
because it was derivative of the illegally heard conversation.395 The Supreme 
Court of Oregon agreed with the trial court because the private citizen’s access 
to the cordless telephone conversation was illegal.396 
In 2000, in State v. Fleetwood, an informant was wearing a transmitter that 
permitted a detective to record conversations in Fleetwood’s home; these 
conversations included Fleetwood’s side of a telephone conversation, a 
conversation between Fleetwood and his mother, and Fleetwood’s conversation 
with the informant.397 The Supreme Court of Oregon determined that the secretly 
taped suspect’s side of the conversation was inadmissible because the informant 
was not a party to the telephone conversation and neither party to the 
conversation consented to the conversation being taped.398 The Oregon court 
decided that the conversation between Fleetwood and his mother was 
inadmissible because the informant was not a party to the conversation.399 The 
secretly taped conversation was also inadmissible because the taping did not 
comply with the color of law exception.400 Since Fleetwood, the color of law 
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statutory exception was amended. 
In 2012, in State v. Miskell, the Supreme Court of Oregon interpreted the 
exigency provision in the statutory color of law exception that would have 
permitted police officers to secretly tape a conversation between an informant 
and the suspects in the informant’s hotel room. 401 The Oregon court decided that 
the exigency provision did not cover the taping situation and the taped 
conversation was inadmissible.402 The court reasoned that the available four-
hour window between finalization of the plan to secretly tape the hotel room 
conversation and the secret taping was sufficient for the police officer to obtain 
a court order.403 
J. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania protection against eavesdropping and wiretapping requires all-
party consent for face-to-face and telephone conversations.404 Pennsylvania 
permits one-party consent to secretly tape a conversation where the person 
taping has reasonable suspicion of a crime of violence and where there is reason 
to believe that the secret taping will yield evidence of the crime.405 
On September 10, 2019, in Commonwealth v. Mason, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania granted an appeal limited to the following two issues: 
(1) Whether a babysitter has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the bedroom of a child she is caring for? 
(2) Whether the sounds resulting from a child being forcibly thrown 
into a crib and being beaten by [Mason] constitute “oral 
communications” or “evidence derived therefrom” under the 
Pennsylvania wiretap statute?406 
In Mason, the father had hired Mason to serve as a nanny for his children.407 
Suspecting child abuse, the father questioned Mason, but she denied any 
problem.408 The father installed a hidden nanny camera with video-and-audio 
capabilities in the children’s bedroom; Mason was unaware of the device.409 The 
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hidden device secretly taped Mason allegedly yelling at one of the children, 
shoving the child into a crib, and hitting the child several times.410 After the 
father turned over the secretly taped information to the police, Mason was 
charged with several crimes.411 Mason claimed that the secretly taped 
information was collected in violation of the Pennsylvania eavesdropping 
statutes.412 The trial court granted Mason’s motion to suppress.413 
On interlocutory appeal to consider the admissibility of the secretly taped 
information, the intermediate appellate court made several findings.414 First, the 
court found that the trial court was correct in ruling that the captured words and 
sounds were inadmissible, and the sounds should not be treated differently than 
the words.415 Second, at the Commonwealth’s urging, the court considered 
whether the secretly taped Wiretap Act exception of non-interception should 
apply.416 The court found that Mason’s expectation of privacy was reasonable 
because the secret taping was done in a bedroom and Mason had no reason to 
suspect that she would be secretly taped.417 Therefore, the audio words and 
sounds were protected against being secretly taped.418 Lastly, the 
Commonwealth argued that the secretly taped information was admissible under 
the “crime exception” to the Wiretap Act.419 The court noted that the father had 
waited two months after suspecting Mason of engaging in child abuse to install 
the nanny camera. 420 The court found that the facts provided failed to support 
the father’s reason to believe that the secret taping would produce evidence of a 
crime of violence.421 The court did find that the trial court wrongly excluded the 
video portion of the secretly taped information, as the video is not protected 
against secret taping under the Pennsylvania eavesdropping statutes.422 
K. Washington 
Washington’s protections against eavesdropping and wiretapping requires all-
party consent for face-to-face and telephone conversations.423 Washington 
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permits one-party consent to secretly tape a conversation where the conversation 
is of emergency nature, anonymous, repeated, or made at inconvenient times or 
is related to threats of extortion, blackmail, bodily harm, other unlawful requests 
or demands, or a hostage or barricade situation.424 
In 1996, in State v. Clark, an informant in a vehicle equipped with a hidden 
camera posed as an illegal drug purchaser.425 The undercover operation resulted 
in sixteen arrests, with all suspects claiming that the secretly taped conversations 
should be suppressed, but all the suppression motions were denied.426 The secret 
taping was court authorized, but the court authorization was not dealt with in the 
majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington.427 The Washington court 
focused on whether the secretly taped conversations qualified as a private 
conversation protected against being secretly taped under the state 
eavesdropping statutes.428 The court stated, “[t]he conversations here were not 
private because they were routine conversations between strangers on the street 
concerning routine illegal drug sales.”429 The court concluded that the lower 
courts had been correct in ruling the secretly taped conversations admissible.430 
One justice concurred in part and dissented in part.431 The justice opined that 
the four suspects whose transactions occurred in the informant’s vehicle did 
engage in private conversation and the almost-blanket court authorization was 
insufficient.432 
In 2004, in State v. Christensen, Christensen, who allegedly had information 
about a purse-snatching, telephoned his girlfriend. 433 The girlfriend’s mother 
answered and, after her daughter left the room, used the speakerphone on the 
cordless telephone to secretly listen in to the conversation between Christensen 
and her daughter.434 The mother testified at Christensen’s trial.435 The Supreme 
Court of Washington considered whether the trial court was correct in permitting 
the mother to testify.436 The Washington court found that Christensen’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable and there was no exception that would 
                                                          
 424 § 9.73.030(2). 
 425 State v. Clark, 916 P.2d 384, 388 (Wash. 1996). 
 426 Id. at 390. 
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 433 State v. Christensen, 102 P.3d 789, 790–91 (Wash. 2004). 
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permit a parent to listen in to a minor’s telephone conversation.437 The court 
found that the cordless phone-base unit was a device designed to transmit within 
the meaning of the state wiretapping statutes.438 The court decided that the trial 
court had erred in permitting the mother to testify and the error was sufficiently 
serious to entitle Christensen to a new trial.439 
In 2014, in State v. Kipp, Kipp’s brother-in-law secretly taped a conversation 
with Kipp that took place in a private home in which the brother-in-law accused 
Kipp of allegedly sexually assaulting two of the brother-in-law’s daughters.440 
The Supreme Court of Washington held that Kipp’s expectation of privacy was 
reasonable and the trial court was incorrect in denying Kipp’s motion to suppress 
the secretly taped conversation.441 The Washington court found that Kipp’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable because of both the fairly short duration 
and the sensitive nature of the conversation and the location of the conversation 
in a private home exclusively between two family members.442 
In 2017, in State v. Smith, the Smiths were engaging in a domestic dispute 
that resulted in the wife being seriously injured.443 During the episode, the 
suspect tried to find his cell phone by calling the cell phone from the home 
phone.444 Voicemail recorded part of the incident while the home phone 
remained active.445 After Smith was arrested, he filed a motion to have the 
voicemail audio suppressed.446 The Supreme Court of Washington first found 
that the voicemail audio was not a conversation under the state eavesdropping 
statutes because the content was primarily sound.447 In addition, the Washington 
court found that the taping fell within the one-party consent threat exception to 
the statutes because Smith was the one who called his cell phone and, because 
of Smith’s familiarity with the cell phone’s voicemail taping capability, Smith 
consented to the taping.448 The court reinstated Smith’s conviction.449 
There were two concurring opinions.450 The first concurring opinion pointed 
out that Smith had no standing because he was the one who made the 
                                                          
 437 Id. at 792. 
 438 Id. at 793–94. 
 439 Id. at 796. 
 440 State v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1031 (Wash. 2014). 
 441 Id. at 1035–36. 
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recording.451 The second concurring opinion would have found that the 
information recorded was a conversation and found that Smith did have an 
expectation of privacy that was reasonable, given that the couple was alone in 
their home.452 However, the information taped with one-party consent was 
admissible under the threat exception; Smith consented to the taping, given his 
familiarity with the capability of his cell phone.453 
V. ONE-PARTY CONSENT 
As explained above, the majority of the states permit a conversation to be 
secretly taped with one party’s consent. This section includes cases from several 
states that involved one-party consent. 
A. South Dakota 
In 1985, in State v. Woods, a paid law enforcement agent was wearing a 
hidden device that permitted the sheriff to monitor and secretly tape the agent’s 
alleged purchase of illegal drugs from Woods. 454 Woods claimed that the 
secretly taped conversation was inadmissible because there was no court 
order.455 The Supreme Court of South Dakota distinguished the facts in Woods 
from a situation in which a non-participant secretly eavesdrops on a 
conversation.456 The South Dakota court referenced several similar U.S. 
Supreme Court cases in which an informant secretly transmitted or recorded a 
conversation and the suspect assumed the risk that the substance of the 
conversation might be disclosed.457 In arriving at this interpretation, the South 
Dakota court was strongly influenced by decisions of federal courts interpreting 
similar language in the federal statutes.458 
In 1990, in State v. Braddock, an acquaintance of Braddock called Braddock, 
and police officers secretly taped the telephone conversation with the 
acquaintance’s permission.459 Braddock claimed that the secretly taped 
telephone conversation was inadmissible because one-person consent was 
inapplicable to the secret taping of a telephone conversation and secret taping 
                                                          
 451 Id. at 1004 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). 
 452 Id. at 1005–07 (McCloud, J., concurring). 
 453 Id. at 1007. 
 454 State v. Woods, 361 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1985). 
 455 Id. 
 456 Id. 
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 459 State v. Braddock, 452 N.W.2d 785, 787 (S.D. 1990). 
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required prior court authorization.460 The Supreme Court of South Dakota 
concluded that one-party consent applied to permit secret taping of a telephone 
conversation and no prior court approval was necessary.461 
B. Texas 
In 2017, in Long v. State, Long was convicted for allegedly encouraging her 
daughter, C.L., to secretly tape Coach Townsend’s half-time and after-game 
speeches. 462 Long was an Argyle school board member, and C.L. was a student 
at Argyle High School.463 The Argyle High School girls’ basketball team was 
playing an away game at Sanger High School, a rival high school whose girls’ 
basketball team was one game ahead of Argyle in the standings.464 C.L., 
claiming to be a team manager, gained access to the visitor’s locker room and 
set up her phone to make a secret audio-and-video taping of the coach’s half-
time speech.465 C.L. was also able to make an audio taping of the coach’s after-
game speech.466 An edited version of the two tapings was emailed to the school 
board members so they would have the information prior to deciding whether to 
grant Coach Townsend a term contract.467 Long showed an assistant principal 
part of the secretly taped information.468 The police investigation turned up 
Long’s written statement that contained criticism of the coach’s harsh treatment 
of players.469 
Long claimed that Coach Townsend did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the locker room, and therefore Long had not done anything illegal.470 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas noted that the Texas definition of oral 
communication was very similar to the federal statute, which led the court to use 
the Katz two-step test in deciding Long.471 The Texas court found that Coach 
Townsend had an expectation of privacy and the expectation was reasonable.472 
The locker room was limited to coaches and team players, and there were two 
sets of doors at the locker-room entrance.473 
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The dissent likened the locker room to a classroom. It pointed out that the 
locker-room door was open, there were three other coaches in the room, and 
Coach Townsend was speaking in a loud voice about player performance and 
did not discuss game strategy.474 
In 2018, in White v. State,475 a roofing company owner received a telephone 
call from Brandon, who sent the owner a recorded audio conversation in which 
Brandon, White, and Robey were discussing some of their activities involving 
the roofing company. After the owner contacted the police, White and Robey 
were charged with engaging in organized criminal activity and money 
laundering.476 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas agreed with the two 
lower courts that the audio-recorded conversation was admissible.477 
C. Wisconsin 
In 2008, in State v. Duchow, the allegedly threatening statements that public 
school bus driver Duchow made to a disabled child on Duchow’s bus were 
secretly taped by a voice-activated device the child’s parents hid in the child’s 
backpack.478 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the secretly taped 
statements were not protected as oral communication under the state statutes; 
because Duchow’s claimed expectation of privacy was not reasonable, the 
statements would be admissible.479 The Wisconsin court explained, “because 
Duchow’s statements were made on a public school bus, being used for the 
public purpose of transporting school children; because they were threats to 
harm Jacob for which Duchow assumed the risk that Jacob would report, 
Duchow had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his statements.”480 
VI. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY STANDARD AS 
BASED ON DISCRETION 
The key to interpreting and applying many all-party consent statutes is 
whether a conversation is private, which is often gauged by whether the suspect 
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has an expectation of privacy that is reasonable.481 Determining whether there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy also comes into play in a one-party consent 
jurisdiction when a non-participant secretly tapes a conversation.482 A 
reasonable expectation of privacy is a standard that must be applied by the judge 
on a case-by-case basis.483 A standard is clearly divorced from the facts and may 
provide little certainty in guiding the judge in decision-making, as the standard 
is somewhat vague. A suspect’s expectation of privacy is dependent on the facts 
and, more particularly, on the judge’s view of the facts. In most cases, the result 
is not clear-cut, or predictable, and different judges draw a variety of disparate 
inferences from the same facts. An indication of this imprecision is that the 
standard is applied differently by different levels of judges as a case is appealed, 
perhaps with an intermediate appellate court reversing the trial court decision 
and the intermediate appellate court decision being reversed by the court of last 
resort. Other indications of the imprecision in applying the standard of 
reasonableness are justices authoring concurring or dissenting opinions and a 
case being overruled fairly soon after having been decided. There are various 
steps throughout the adjudicative process at which judges can correct decisions 
made at earlier steps. However, correction with excess frequency creates a sense 
of instability. 
One may be wondering why judges differ so greatly in their views of a case. 
Perhaps one reason lies in the nature of a standard: a standard permits a judge to 
exercise considerable discretion.484 A suspect typically claims an expectation of 
privacy. A judge has leeway in the way in which they characterize the facts and 
in identifying which facts are the most significant.485 A judge may be guided, at 
least in part, by the judge’s emotions in making this factual determination.486 
The judge’s view of the facts provides the judge discretion in determining 
whether the suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable under the 
circumstances.487 The perception is that a standard permits the judge some 
                                                          
 481 See Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d at 511, 524–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see also 
Duchow, 749 N.W.2d at 920 (both cases explaining the two-prong test for determining 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 482 See State v. Braddock, 452 N.W.2d 785, 788 (S.D. 1990) (explaining the court’s 
reliance on the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in one-party consent cases). 
 483 See Long, 535 S.W.3d at 524–25; see also Duchow, 749 N.W.2d at 920. 
 484 See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Judicial Standard of Review and Webster, 
15 AM. J. L. & MED. 211, 211 (1989) (describing judicial standards of review). 
 485 See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. Legal Stud. 129, 
131 (1980) (explaining the amount of discretion given to judges). 
 486 Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do 
Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 898–900 (2015). 
One study showed that a judge may be guided by emotion in applying a standard. 
 487 Id. at 900. 
54 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
discretion.488 Great minds can differ on which facts are salient and how the 
standard of reasonableness applies to the significant facts. Judicial discretion is 
not unfettered because the judge’s final decision must be substantiated with 
reasoning. A judge’s interpretation of reasonableness based on the facts of the 
case often can be accomplished without the necessity of the judge carving out a 
judicial exception to the application of the statute. 
In all-party consent states, the judge’s determination whether the suspect’s 
expectation of privacy is reasonable is pivotal. The judge’s conclusion is pivotal 
because it is the basis for finding the secretly taped conversation admissible or 
inadmissible.489 The determination of reasonableness is crucial where the 
secretly taped conversation is the sole piece of incriminating evidence against 
the suspect. Typically, whether the suspect’s expectation of privacy is 
reasonable is hotly contested because the decision may end the litigation. The 
trial judge bases the judge’s finding that the suspect’s expectation of privacy was 
or was not reasonable on the judge’s inferences drawn from the facts. 
Previously, this paper reviewed case law interpreting eavesdropping and 
wiretapping statutes. The following sections briefly review some of those cases 
again with a focus on each court’s interpretation of whether the suspect’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable. In some of those cases, the court seems 
to stretch in its interpretation of the reasonableness of the suspect’s expectation 
of privacy to produce the desired result. 
VII. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION STANDARD AND 
INTERPRETATION OF A STATE CONSTITUTION 
The reasonable expectation standard is commonly used in interpreting a state 
constitution, with location of the secret taping often being the key in applying 
the standard.490 Many state courts have been guided by the reasoning of Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in United States v. White when the secret taping occurred in a 
home.491 This holds true in Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, and West Virginia. 
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A. Alaska 
The Supreme Court of Alaska has drawn the parameters of protection against 
taping under the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution.492 According to 
the Alaska court, one’s home is a protected location while the roadside and an 
office open to the public are not protected locations.493 
In 1978, in State v. Glass, the Supreme Court of Alaska found that the privacy 
provision in the Alaska Constitution did protect a suspect in his own home being 
taped by the police, through an informant meeting with the suspect wearing a 
radio transmitter, because the dual requirement of an expectation of privacy that 
was reasonable was satisfied.494 In 1984, in City and Borough of Juneau v. 
Quinto, the Supreme Court of Alaska found that the privacy provision in the 
Alaska Constitution did not protect a motorist pulled over by a police officer on 
suspicion of drunk driving from being secretly taped by the officer because the 
motorist’s expectation of privacy under the circumstances was not reasonable.495 
In 2001, in Cowles v. State, the Supreme Court of Alaska found that the privacy 
provision in the Alaska Constitution did not protect the manager of a university 
box office suspected of stealing from being secretly videotaped by a video 
camera installed above her desk because the suspect’s claimed expectation of 
privacy was not reasonable given that the alleged theft occurred in an area visible 
to the public.496 The dissenting opinion stated that the manager’s expectation of 
privacy was reasonable and the overhead video camera “exceeded her 
reasonably expected public observation in its duration, proximity, focus, and 
vantage point.”497 
B. Connecticut 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the search-and-seizure 
provision of the Connecticut Constitution did not protect against secret taping of 
a telephone conversation with only one party’s consent.498 
In 2015, in State v. Skok, the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that 
Skok’s expectation of privacy in her telephone conversations with Becker was 
not reasonable because Skok reminded Becker a number of times that Becker 
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should not permit family to overhear their conversation, indicating that Skok 
believed in the possibility that Becker’s family would overhear the 
conversations.499 
C. Massachusetts 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has found protection against 
secret taping under the search-and-seizure provision of the Massachusetts 
Constitution for a conversation occurring in a suspect’s home or overheard from 
a crawl space underneath the suspect’s home, but not for a conversation 
transpiring in a motel room of another or over the telephone.500 
In 1987, in Commonwealth v. Blood, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts found that the search-and-seizure provision in the Massachusetts 
Constitution did protect a suspect in a home being taped by the police through 
an informant wearing a radio transmitter while meeting with the suspect because 
the suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable.501 The dissenting opinion 
evaluated the suspect’s expectation of privacy, stating that it is “no longer 
reasonable when the home becomes a site for planning criminal activity.”502 In 
1989, in Commonwealth v. Panetti, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
extended the location in which a suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
protected against secret taping to a crawl space underneath the suspect’s 
apartment because “the police officer was positioned where neither neighbors 
nor the public would ordinarily be expected to be.”503 The dissenting opinion 
evaluated the suspect’s expectation as not reasonable: the police officer was 
lawfully in the crawl space in which the suspect had no legal interest.504 In 1990, 
in Commonwealth v. Price, the Massachusetts court ruled that the suspect’s 
expectation of privacy did not extend to a motel room where the suspect was not 
the one to whom the motel room was registered.505 In 1998, in Commonwealth 
v. Eason, the court found that a suspect speaking on the telephone did not have 
an expectation of privacy that was reasonable. 506 
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D. Montana 
Although the Supreme Court of Montana now interprets the Montana 
Constitution as providing significant protection against a conversation being 
secretly taped,507 the court has seesawed back-and-forth in the past thirty-five 
years: State v. Goetz508 in 2008 overruled State v. Brown,509 a 1988 case, which 
in turn had overruled State v. Brackman,510 a 1978 case. 
In State v. Goetz, police officers monitored and secretly taped the suspect’s 
conversation through the use of an informant. In 2008, the Supreme Court of 
Montana decided that the suspect’s conversations that occurred either in the 
suspect’s home or in the informant’s vehicle should be protected against 
transmission because the expectation of privacy was reasonable in a private 
setting.511 There did not seem to be a consensus among the seven members of 
the court.512 Besides the majority opinion, there were two concurring opinions, 
two dissenting opinions, and an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.513 
The different Goetz opinions varied in reasoning.514 One concurring opinion 
would not have limited protection against secret taping to a home or vehicle, 
stating that “Montanans do not have to anticipate that a conversation, no matter 
what setting, is being secretly recorded by agents of the state acting without the 
benefit of a search warrant.”515 An opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part agreed with the reasonable privacy expectation that the majority applied to 
the home setting, but would not have recognized a similar reasonable 
expectation of privacy for a vehicle because the suspect who conducted his 
conversation “did not know the informant, and presumably he would not know 
whether the informant owned or controlled the vehicle in which the conversation 
took place.”516 The dissenting opinion focused on the commercial nature of a 
business transaction with strangers as foreclosing a professed expectation of 
privacy as being reasonable no matter the location.517 
In 2010, in State v. Allen, the Supreme Court of Montana extended the 
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protection against secret taping under the Montana Constitution to an informant 
secretly taping cell-phone conversations between the suspect and the informant. 
The court held that the suspect’s expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell 
phone that the conversation is not being monitored by the government is one that 
society would recognize as reasonable.518 The concurring opinion would have 
extended the Montana Constitution’s protection to the informant’s testimony 
about the secretly taped cell-phone conversation because both the verbal and 
taped conversations would have required a search warrant.519 An opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part would have affirmed the trial court’s 
denial of the suspect’s motion to suppress the secretly taped conversation 
between the suspect and the informant, noting that the suspect’s expectation of 
privacy was not reasonable because the suspect was speaking with others during 
his cell-phone conversations with the informant.520 
In 2012, in State v. Stewart, the Supreme Court of Montana was tasked with 
applying Allen to a case in which a daughter permitted the police to secretly tape 
four telephone conversations with her father to gather evidence that the father 
had been sexually abusing her for the past eleven years.521 The Montana court 
ruled that admission of the secretly taped telephone calls was a harmless error 
because of all the evidence against the suspect admitted at trial.522 
The case law of the Supreme Court of Montana protecting conversations from 
being secretly taped has had something of a rocky trajectory from 1978 to 2008. 
The Supreme Court of Montana now interprets the Montana Constitution as 
protecting face-to-face conversations occurring in homes and vehicles and 
telephone conversations from being secretly taped.523 The extension of 
protection to telephone conversations under the state constitution is significantly 
broader than that provided under the Fourth Amendment.524 The protection 
provided for telephone conversations narrows the judge’s discretion to decide 
whether or not to suppress a telephone conversation.525 One could imagine that 
Stewart was somewhat of a difficult case for the Supreme Court of Montana to 
decide. The court had recently decided Allen and so might have been loath to 
create some type of exception that would have permitted the secretly taped 
telephone conversations in Stewart to be suppressed. The alleged crime in 
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Stewart was extremely serious: a father was accused by his daughter of sexually 
abusing her for eleven years.526 Stewart would have been even more difficult to 
decide if the telephone conversations were the only evidence in the case. Perhaps 
the Montana court was relieved that the harmless error ruling was available to 
it. 
E. North Dakota 
North Dakota is a one-party consent state.527 In 2010, in State v. Loh, the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to accept the suspect’s suggestion that 
the court follow Goetz in interpreting the North Dakota Constitution to protect 
the suspect’s conversation with an informant in the informant’s car.528 Thus, 
North Dakota provides no additional protection under the state constitution 
against a conversation being secretly taped.529 
F. Pennsylvania 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted the search-and-seizure 
provision to protect a suspect from being secretly taped when a suspect is 
speaking with an informant in the suspect’s home when the police sent the 
informant into the suspect’s home, but not when the suspect is speaking on the 
telephone even if the suspect is in the suspect’s home.530 
In 1994, in Commonwealth v. Brion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
reasoned that the key to finding the suspect’s expectation of privacy to be 
reasonable was that the secretly taped conversation occurred in the suspect’s 
home.531 In 2001, in Commonwealth v. Rekasie, the secretly taped conversation 
was over the telephone and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that 
this mode of communication meant that the suspect’s expectation of privacy was 
not reasonable.532 Two dissenting opinions would have found the suspect’s 
expectation of privacy reasonable because, similar to Brion, the suspect was in 
his home speaking on the telephone.533 In 2014, in Commonwealth v. 
Dunnavent, the lower court decision suppressing the secretly taped conversation 
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was affirmed; the justices in Dunnavent were evenly split three to three as to 
whether a suspect who first met the informant on the street corner and then 
invited the informant into the suspect’s home had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy that their conversation in his home would not be secretly taped.534 The 
crucial fact distinguishing Dunnavent from Brion for some of the justices was 
that the suspect invited the informant into the suspect’s home.535 
G. Vermont 
The Supreme Court of Vermont has interpreted the search-and-seizure 
provision of the Vermont Constitution to protect a suspect from being secretly 
taped in the suspect’s home either by an informant or by a police officer, but the 
court ruled that the protection does not extend to a conversation secretly taped 
in a shopping-center parking lot while the suspect and the informant each spoke 
from their respective vehicles.536 
In 1991, in State v. Blow, the Supreme Court of Vermont found that the 
suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable when an informant secretly 
taped the suspect in the suspect’s home.537 In 1991, in State v. Brooks, the 
Supreme Court of Vermont found that the suspect’s expectation of privacy was 
not reasonable when an informant secretly taped the suspect in a shopping-center 
parking lot even though the informant and the suspect remained in their 
respective vehicles.538 The lengthy dissent was suspicious that Brooks might 
permit the police to hatch a plan to induce the suspect to leave his or her home 
to travel to a location in which the police could secretly tape the informant’s 
conversation with the suspect.539 In 2002, in State v. Geraw, the Supreme Court 
of Vermont decided that the suspect’s expectation of privacy was still reasonable 
in the suspect’s home even if the suspect knew he was speaking with police 
officers.540 A lengthy dissent opined that the suspect’s expectation of privacy 
was not reasonable because the suspect knew that the individuals he invited into 
the suspect’s home were police officers who were investigating the suspect’s 
involvement in child sexual molestation.541 
                                                          
 534 Dunnavent, 107 A.3d at 30–31; see also Rekasie, 778 A.2d at 632–33 (Castille, C.J., 
in support of reversal). 
 535 Dunnavent, 107 A.3d at 31 (Saylor, J., in support of affirmance); see also id. at 31 
(Todd, J., in support of affirmance) (Castille, C.J., in support of reversal); see also id. at 52 
(Stevens, J., in support of reversal). 
 536 State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552, 555, 556 (Vt. 1991). 
 537 Id. 
 538 State v. Brooks, 601 A.2d 963, 964 (Vt. 1991). 
 539 Id. at 965 (Morse, J., dissenting). 
 540 State v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219, 1224 (Vt. 2002). 
 541 Id. at 1233 (Skoglund, J., dissenting). 
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H. West Virginia 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia interpreted the search-and-
seizure provision of the West Virginia Constitution to protect a suspect’s 
conversation from being secretly taped in the suspect’s home.542 
In 2007, in State v. Mullens, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
found that the suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable when an 
informant secretly taped the suspect and the suspect’s wife in their home.543 The 
first dissenting opinion questioned the court overruling its decision from twenty-
one years previously without providing better reasoning.544 The second 
dissenting opinion criticized the majority’s protection against secretly taping a 
conversation occurring in the suspect’s home when the informant can freely take 
notes of what transpired during the conversation in the home.545 
VIII. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION STANDARD AND 
INTERPRETATION OF ALL-PARTY CONSENT STATUTES 
A number of all-party consent states protect face-to-face conversations only 
if the conversations are private. Some states gauge whether a face-to-face 
conversation is private by determining whether the complaining party has an 
expectation of privacy that is reasonable. In some of the difficult cases, a court 
has carefully characterized the facts when determining whether the suspect’s 
expectation of privacy is reasonable, perhaps to permit the court to reach a 
desired result. 
A. Florida 
The Florida Supreme Court has had difficulty in two cases in which a victim 
secretly taped a conversation in a secluded location. In one case in which the 
secret taping occurred in an office open to the public, the court found that the 
suspect’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable. In another case in which 
the secret taping occurred in the suspect’s bedroom, the court found that the 
suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable.546 
In the first case, State v. Inciarrano, the court interpreted the facts in what 
might be seen as a judicial exception to conclude that the murderer’s expectation 
of privacy was not reasonable.547 In Inciarrano, the murder victim apparently 
                                                          
 542 State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 171, 187–188, 190 (W. Va. 2007). 
 543 Id. at 171, 190. 
 544 Id. at 171, 191–92 (Benjamin, J., dissenting). 
 545 Id. at 171, 214 (Maynard, J., dissenting). 
 546 McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 298, 300 (Fla. 2014). 
 547 State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1275–76 (Fla. 1985). 
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had a feeling that his meeting with the suspect was not going to go well and 
began secretly taping his meeting with Inciarrano prior to Inciarrano allegedly 
murdering the victim.548 Although another tenant in the building heard faint 
gunshots, and Inciarrano admitted that it was his voice on the tape, the secretly 
taped information was the only evidence against Inciarrano.549 The Florida court 
concluded that Inciarrano’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable because 
Inciarrano had criminal intent when Inciarrano visited the victim in the victim’s 
office.550 The trial court perhaps provided better reasoning, noting that the 
victim’s office was open to the public and that the microphone would have been 
visible to the suspect.551 The first concurring opinion reasoned that someone in 
another person’s home or office does not have an expectation of privacy that is 
reasonable, but that person’s expectation of privacy might be reasonable if the 
person was located in his or her own home or office.552 The second concurring 
opinion stated that the victim, who was a party to the conversation, could not 
intercept the information.553 The concurrence added that the suspect’s 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable because the suspect was not in the 
suspect’s own home.554 The concurrence also showed the fallacy in the 
majority’s reasoning: “To hold, as the majority does, that the commission of a 
criminal act waives a privacy right requires an entirely new legal definition of 
privacy rights which would, in turn, shake the foundation of fourth amendment 
analysis.”555 
The facts of another relevant case, McDade v. State were discussed above in 
section IVB.556 
Perhaps one distinction between Inciarrano and McDade was that the secretly 
taped conversation was the sole piece of evidence in Inciarrano, while in 
McDade there was other evidence, such as testimony, available.557 Without the 
secretly taped conversation in Inciarrano, a cold-blooded murderer would have 
gone free. It is extremely unfortunate that McDade was acquitted at his second 
trial. 
                                                          
 548 Id. The victim’s premonition about the meeting was confirmed by the tone of the 
conversation being that of “a business deal gone sour.” Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 
387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). 
 549 Inciarrano, 447 So. 2d at 387–88, quashed, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). 
 550 Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1275–76. 
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 552 Id. at 1276 (Overton, J., concurring). 
 553 Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in result only). 
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 555 Id. at 1277. 
 556 See infra text accompanying notes 328–39. 
 557 McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 295 (Fla. 2014); see also Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 
1272. 
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B. Maryland 
Even though Maryland is an all-party consent state, a suspect cannot make 
offensive use of the all-party consent state where the suspect is the one who 
secretly taped a conversation.558 
In 2018, in Agnew v. State, the police, pursuant to a warrant, recovered the 
suspect’s cell phone, which contained a conversation between the suspect and 
an unidentified person.559 The suspect claimed that the taped cell-phone 
conversation should not have been used as evidence against him because it had 
been made with only one-party consent.560 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
found that the suspect’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable because he 
was the one who did the taping and concluded that the suspect’s secretly taped 
telephone conversation was properly admitted.561 
C. Michigan 
In Michigan, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided that someone speaking 
on a cordless telephone had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the 
conversation would not be overheard through a scanner. The court also found 
that an expectation of privacy was not reasonable in the backstage of an arena 
where there were a number of people and camera crews in the area.562 
In 2001, People v. Stone, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided whether 
the estranged husband had illegally used a scanner to eavesdrop on and secretly 
tape his wife’s private cordless telephone conversations.563 The court concluded 
that the wife’s expectation of privacy was reasonable because secretly accessing 
her cordless telephone conversations is a felony, even if current technology 
makes it possible to do so.564 In 2011, in Bowens v. Ary, Inc. the Supreme Court 
of Michigan considered whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy during their backstage meeting with the defendants at the Joe Louis 
Arena when at least nine people were present, a number of individuals had 
backstage passes, there were multiple camera crews nearby, and there was a 
person filming in the room.565 Based on the facts, the Michigan court agreed 
with the trial court and decided as a matter of law that the plaintiffs’ claimed 
                                                          
 558 Agnew v. State, 197 A.3d 27, 33 (Md. 2018). 
 559 Id. at 30. 
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 562 People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Mich. 2001); Bowens v. Ary, Inc., 794 
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expectation of privacy was not reasonable.566 The dissent’s major disagreement 
was with the Michigan court of last resort deciding that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy as a matter of law; the dissent viewed the facts in a way 
that was not as clearly cut as the majority.567 
D. Pennsylvania 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has yet to weigh in on an interesting case 
involving whether a nanny’s expectation of privacy in the children’s bedroom 
of the employer’s home is reasonable.568 
In Commonwealth v. Mason, the father suspected Mason, the children’s 
nanny, of child abuse about a month after he hired her.569 About two months 
after she denied any problem, the father installed a hidden nanny camera with 
video-and-audio capabilities in the children’s bedroom.570 The hidden nanny 
camera secretly taped Mason yelling at one of the children, shoving the child 
into a crib, and hitting the child several times.571 Mason was arrested and several 
charges were filed against her after the father turned over the secretly taped 
information to the police.572 The intermediate appellate court found that Mason’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable because the secret taping was done in a 
bedroom, and Mason had no reason to suspect that she would be secretly 
taped.573 The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress the audio 
portion of the recording, but it reversed as to the video portion.574 Although the 
court agreed that the audio portion of the recording should be suppressed, the 
language of the decision suggests that the court was judgmental about the two-
month lapse of time between the father’s suspicion of child abuse and the 
installation of the nanny camera.575 One judge, who authored an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, would not have found the nanny’s 
expectation of privacy to be reasonable because the children’s home was a 
workplace and the nanny was an adult not in her own home who was responsible 
for young children.576 On September 10, 2019, in Commonwealth v. Mason, the 
                                                          
 566 Id. at 844. 
 567 Id. at 845–46 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted an appeal limited to the following two 
issues: 
(1) Whether a babysitter has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the bedroom of a child she is caring for? 
(2) Whether the sounds resulting from a child being forcibly thrown 
into a crib and being beaten by [Mason] constitute “oral 
communications” or “evidence derived therefrom” under the 
Pennsylvania wiretap statute?577 
E. Washington 
In Washington, the Supreme Court of Washington decided that a suspect’s 
expectation of privacy on a street and in the informant’s vehicle was not 
reasonable, while a suspect speaking on a cordless telephone and in an upstairs 
room of a private home did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.578 
In 1996, in State v. Clark, the Supreme Court of Washington determined that 
individuals selling illegal drugs to strangers on the street did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that a government informant was not secretly 
taping their conversations.579 One justice who concurred in part and dissented in 
part believed that four of the sixteen suspects who sold illegal drugs to the 
informant while in the informant’s vehicle were engaging in private 
conversations protected under the eavesdropping statutes.580 
In 2004, in State v. Christensen, when the suspect telephoned his girlfriend, 
the girlfriend’s mother secretly listened in on the cordless telephone 
conversation using the speakerphone function.581  The Supreme Court of 
Washington court found that Christensen’s expectation of privacy was 
reasonable and no exception would permit a parent to listen in on a minor’s 
telephone conversation.582 
In 2014, in State v. Kipp, the Supreme Court of Washington found that the 
suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable because of the fairly short ten-
minute duration, the sensitive nature of the conversation concerning the sexual 
assault of the accuser’s daughters, and the location of the conversation upstairs 
in a private home between two family members and without anyone else being 
present.583 Despite the Washington Supreme Court’s holding, the facts 
                                                          
 577 Commonwealth v. Mason, 217 A.3d 802, 803 (Pa. 2019). 
 578 State v. Clark, 916 P.2d 384, 387, 395 (Wash. 1996). 
 579 Id. at 396 (holding that brief conversations “involving strangers on a public street and 
concerned the term of routine drug transactions” were not private). 
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determining whether the suspect’s expectation of privacy was reasonable is 
disputable.584 Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court found that 
the suspect’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable based on the fact that 
the subject matter of the conversation was child molestation, the suspect 
confessing something to the victims’ father that is not the sort to remain private, 
the meeting occurring in a common area of the home, and the suspect’s offering 
to later meet with the father in private.585 Perhaps the two lower courts viewed 
the facts differently because the secretly taped conversation, although not the 
only evidence, was a significant piece of evidence.586 
IX. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION STANDARD AND 
INTERPRETATION OF ONE-PARTY CONSENT STATUTES 
In one-party consent jurisdictions, the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard comes into play when a non-participant secretly tapes a conversation.587 
In several of the cases below, the court’s characterization of the facts might lead 
one to believe that the court was reaching for a desired result. 
A. Texas 
In Long v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas could have found 
that the expectation of privacy was not reasonable because of the number of 
people present when the coach’s speech was secretly taped.588 
In 2017, in Long v. State, was one case in which the suspect allegedly 
encouraged her high school student daughter to secretly tape the girl basketball 
Coach Townsend’s half-time and after-game speeches that took place in the 
visitor’s locker-room. 589 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas found that 
Coach Townsend had an expectation of privacy, and the expectation was 
reasonable because the locker-room was being put to a private use, the entrance 
was limited to coaches and team players, and there were two sets of doors at the 
locker-room entrance.590 It seems that the Texas court was comfortable with the 
                                                          
violated the privacy act and should be suppressed” because, “Kipp had both a subjective and 
reasonable expectation of privacy as he was speaking in private with his brother-in-law 
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 584 Id. at 1031. 
 585 State v. Kipp, 286 P.3d at 68, 75, rev’d, 317 P.3d 1029 (Wash. 2014). 
 586 Kipp, 286 P.3d at 71. 
 587 Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d at 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); State v. Duchow, 749 
N.W.2d 913, 919–21 (Wis. 2008). 
 588 Long, 535 S.W.3d at 540 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
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suspect mother’s conviction for secretly taping the coach’s speeches, which she 
used to inform the school board about Coach Townsend’s meanness toward his 
players.591 The dissent likened the locker-room to a classroom and pointed out 
that the locker-room door was open, there were three other coaches in the room, 
Coach Townsend was speaking in a loud voice about player performance, and 
he did not discuss game strategy.592 Another fact noted by the dissent was that 
there were a fair number of people in the locker-room, including the team 
members and the various coaches, any of whom could have been secretly taping 
the conversation.593 
B. Wisconsin 
In State v. Duchow, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin seemed determined to 
find that the school bus driver’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable 
because there was no other evidence of the driver’s threats against a disabled 
child.594 
In 2008, in Duchow, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that the public 
school bus driver’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable when the suspect 
allegedly made threatening statements to a disabled child on the suspect’s bus 
when these statements were secretly taped by a voice-activated device hidden 
by the child’s parents in the child’s backpack.595 The reasoning was that the 
location of the secret taping was a public school bus, the suspect and the child 
could be seen through the school bus windows, and the alleged threats were 
likely to be reported.596 The Wisconsin court explained, “because Duchow’s 
statements were made on a public school bus, being used for the public purpose 
of transporting school children; because they were threats to harm Jacob for 
which Duchow assumed the risk that Jacob would report, Duchow had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his statements.”597 
There would have been several potential problems in presenting evidence of 
Duchow’s allegedly threatening statements, had the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin ruled that the secretly taped statements were oral communication.598 
Wisconsin does permit secret taping of a private conversation with one-party’s 
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 592 Id. at 540–41 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
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 594 State v. Duchow, 749 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Wis. 2008). 
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consent.599 However, it appears from the facts that the child’s parents placed the 
voice-activated device in the child’s backpack, perhaps without the child’s 
consent.600 Had the court decided that the conversation was private, the court 
would have had to address whether the parents could have consented on behalf 
of the child.601 Although the Wisconsin statutes permit secret taping with one 
party’s consent, the statutes limit disclosure, in most instances, to testimony 
about the taped information rather than disclosure of the taped information 
itself.602 In addition, the testimony must be related to a felony, and the one who 
consented must be available to testify, or a witness must be available to 
authenticate the taping.603 Duchow and the child were the only ones on the 
school bus when Duchow made the statements,604 so there was no one else 
besides the child who could provide testimony. The child was nine and suffered 
from Down syndrome and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder; for those 
reasons, the child may have been incapable of testifying.605 
X. CONCLUSION 
In the mid-twentieth century, what legislators perceived to be the problem 
was secret taping of conversations. One-party consent statutes and all-party 
consent statutes were two broad pathways for legislation to deal with the 
problem of secret taping. At the time, legislators may not have been cognizant 
of the social consequences of the chosen legislative path. In addition, six state 
courts of last resort have interpreted their state constitutions to require all-party 
consent in certain circumstances, primarily when an informant or police officer 
secretly tapes a suspect’s conversation in the suspect’s home. 
If a state legislature had a clean slate to write on and it wanted to adopt 
eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes, what type of statutes would be the most 
appropriate? Vermont is the only state that does not have eavesdropping and 
wiretapping statutes. If Vermont were to adopt eavesdropping and wiretapping 
statutes,606 should the state go down the all-party consent path or the one-party 
consent path? The Vermont legislature would do well to review eavesdropping 
and wiretapping statutes in other states along with case-law interpretation of 
those statutes to determine how the new statutes should be structured and what 
                                                          
 599 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.29(1) (West 2019). 
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exceptions would be advisable to include. 
With the prevalence of technology all around us, it might be best for a state 
to adopt one-party consent statutes. If the statutes were to contain wording 
similar to the federal statutes, federal case-law might help in interpreting state 
statutes. All-party consent statutes do provide more protection to the parties 
having an intimate conversation, but there are serious costs involved, such as 
criminalizing otherwise innocent behavior and not permitting secret taping to 
gather evidence that would be socially acceptable to secure. If desired, all-party 
consent can be required for conversations taking place in a home. 
As one can see by the case-law examples provided in this paper, neither all-
party consent nor one-party consent statutes are trouble-free. Judges in both all-
party consent and one-party consent jurisdictions have had to use their leeway 
under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to arrive at what at the time 
seemed to be the most appropriate solution, perhaps in doing so creating a case-
law exception. The following two paragraphs provide some information on a 
case-law exception from an all-party consent state and a case-law exception 
from a one-party consent state. 
State v. Inciarrano is the prime case applying the reasonable expectation 
standard in an all-party consent state because had Inciarrano’s expectation of 
privacy have been found to be reasonable, the sole piece of evidence of the 
murder would have had to be excluded. 607 It would have been logical to find 
that Inciarrano’s expectation of privacy was reasonable, given that the murder 
victim worked as a psychologist and marriage counselor whose office was set 
up to be fairly secluded to ensure the client’s confidences were private and, 
presumably, no one saw Inciarrano enter or leave the victim’s office.608 The 
Supreme Court of Florida fashioned what amounted to a case-law exception 
when the court found that Inciarrano’s expectation of privacy was not 
reasonable. 
State v. Duchow609 is the prime case applying the reasonable expectation 
standard in a one-party consent state because, had Duchow’s expectation of 
privacy have been found to be reasonable, the sole piece of evidence of the bus 
driver’s threats against the disabled child would have had to be excluded.610 It 
would have been logical to find that Duchow’s expectation of privacy was 
reasonable, given that the bus driver and the child were the only people on the 
bus and there was no one else in the vicinity who could have overheard the 
threats. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin fashioned what amounted to a case-
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law exception when the court found Duchow’s expectation of privacy was not 
reasonable. 
All-party consent statutes assume that secret taping done by a party to the 
conversation is as intrusive as that done by a non-party. All-party consent 
statutes also assume that the person secretly taping is doing so with malicious 
intentions. However, a party to a conversation is free to divulge the substance of 
the conversation to others or testify about what transpired in the conversation. 
Perhaps one aim of all-party consent statutes was to preserve a trusting 
relationship between the parties to the conversation. The aim is not achieved by 
all-party consent statutes because there is always a danger that the conversation 
is subject to disclosure by one party by that party telling others about the 
conversation. All-party statutes are a type of legislation adopted with the best of 
intentions but as applied, produce results the legislature would not have 
imagined. The misguided result of legislation is only apparent when a judge is 
faced with applying the statute to a live controversy before the judge that forces 
the judge to deal with the hard case. All-party consent statutes are anachronistic 
in light of each cell-phone owner being able to easily secretly tape an otherwise 
private conversation and other taping devices in wide use. With the prevalence 
of surveillance devices and cell phones, one may have reason to think that it is 
more likely than not that one’s conversation is being secretly taped. 
The person desiring privacy may be engaging in unsavory or illegal behavior. 
All-party consent statutes value privacy over an individual’s attempt to gather 
information, even in a circumstance in which the nefarious actions of the person 
desiring privacy would be difficult to prove without secretly taping the 
exchange. The action of secretly taping a conversation may be socially beneficial 
because it may provide evidence not easily refutable of domestic violence, 
abuse, discrimination, or criminal activity. The victim of criminal activity may 
not be sufficiently knowledgeable to seek law-enforcement involvement, which, 
in most all-party consent states, would make the secret taping legal. All-party 
consent statutes also penalize the secret gathering of such information by 
criminalizing the activity of the person performing the secret taping. All-party 
consent statutes can be used by a suspect to prevent incriminating evidence from 
being disclosed. If the secretly taped information is the only evidence against 
the suspect, the non-disclosure may prevent a guilty suspect from being 
convicted of a horrendous crime. Some view all-party consent so problematic 
that they have opined that states requiring all-party consent should replace their 
statutes with one-party consent statutes.611 One’s home has long been regarded 
differently than other locations, and one may feel another order of violation 
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should the person’s conversation be secretly taped in one’s home. Given the 
long-standing privacy protection provided when one is in one’s home, all-party 
consent may be most acceptably required for the home. 
As described in this article, privacy in communication is protected by 
statutory and constitutional provisions. Although the necessity for this 
protection is widely recognized, the protection is far from uniform throughout 
the country. One difficulty in implementing this safeguard is posed by statutes 
designed to protect privacy but which judges have discretion in applying in 
interpreting whether a speaker’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. Another 
difficulty in safeguarding the privacy of communication is the constant advances 
in technology that make it easier as time goes on to invade one’s communication 
privacy. Communication privacy deserves continued protection and the way in 
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APPENDIX A 
State Constitutional Provisions and State Statutes 
Alabama 
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 5. Unreasonable search and seizure; search warrants. 
  




ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14. Searches and Seizures. 
 
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. Right of Privacy: “The right of the people to privacy 
is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this 
section.” Id. 
 
Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168 (Alaska. 2001) The Alaska Supreme Court did 
not extend Glass protection to the box office of a movie theater in a theft 
investigation. See long dissent. 
 
State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978) (“Alaska's Constitution 
mandates that its people be free from invasions of privacy by means of 
surreptitious monitoring of conversations.”). 
 




ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8. Right to privacy: “No person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Id. 
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ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15. Searches and seizures. 
  




CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. Inalienable rights: “All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” 
 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. Searches and seizures; warrant. 
  
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630, 632.1, 632.5-637.2 (West 2020); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 630a, 630b, 631a-631e, 632a, 632(4) (West 2020) (repealed); CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 631, 632 (West 2020) (held unconstitutional). 
 
People v. Guzman, 453 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2019) (holding § 632(d) 
unconstitutional). 





COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7. Security of person and property—searches—seizures-
-warrants. 
  




CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Security from searches and seizures. 
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Delaware 
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Searches and seizures. 
  




FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Searches and Seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the 
unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, 
shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable 
cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places 
to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the 
communication to be intercepted, and the nature of the evidence to be 
obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in 
violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles 
or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United 
State Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Right of privacy: “Every natural person has the right to 
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as 
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the 
public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.” Id. 
  




GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ XIII. Searches, seizures, and warrants. 
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Hawaii 
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6. Right to Privacy: “The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.”  
  
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7. Searches, Seizures and Invasion of Privacy: 
The right of the people be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy 
shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the 
communications sought to be intercepted.  




IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. 
  




ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Searches, Seizures, Privacy and Interceptions: 
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, 
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by 
eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without 
probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.  
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12. Right to Remedy and Justice: “Every person shall find 
a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his 
person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, 
completely, and promptly.”  
  
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -9, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 
5/108A-5/108B (West 2020). 
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Indiana 
IND. CONST. art. I, § 11. Unreasonable search or seizure. 
  





IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8. Personal security--search and seizures. 
  




KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 15. Search and seizure. 
  




KY. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10. Security from search and seizure; conditions 
of issuance of warrant. 
  




LA. CONST. art. I, § 5. Right to Privacy 
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or 
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose 
or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or 
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seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to 
raise its illegality in the appropriate court. 
  




ME. CONST. art. I, § 5. Unreasonable searches prohibited. 
  




MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XXVI. Warrants for search and 
seizure 
  




MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. xiv. Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
warrants. 
  




MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11. Searches and seizures. 
  




MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. 
  
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-.20, 626A.25 (West 2020). 
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MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 23. Searches and seizures. 
  




MO. CONST. art. I, § 15. Unreasonable search and seizure prohibited-- contents 
and basis of warrants. 
  




MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. Right of Privacy: “The right of individual privacy is 
essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without 
the showing of a compelling state interest.” Id. 
 
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11. Searched and seizures:  
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any 
place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the 
place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.  
  




NEB. CONST. art. I, § 7. Search and seizure. 
  
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86-271 to -297 (West 2020). 
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Nevada 
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 18. Unreasonable seizure and search; issuance of warrants. 
  





N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-b. Right to Privacy: “An individual's right to live free 
from governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, 
essential, and inherent.” 
  
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19. Searches and Seizures Regulated. 
 




N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 7. Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
warrant. 
  




N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10. Searches and seizures. 
  




N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Securing against unreasonable searches, seizures and 
interceptions: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
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supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception 
of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and 
ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that 
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus 
obtained, and identifying the particular means of communication, and 
particularly describing the person or persons whose communications 
are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof. 
   
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4506 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §§ 700.05-.70, 710.10 




N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20. General warrants. 
  




N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
  




OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14. Search and seizure. 
  




OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30. Unreasonable searches or seizures--Warrants, 
issuance of. 
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OR. CONST. art. I, § 9. Unreasonable searches or seizures. 
  




PA. CONST. art. I, § 8. Security from searches and seizures. 
  




R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6. Search and seizure. 
  




S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10. Searches and seizures; invasions of privacy: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable 
invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to 
be seized, and the information to be obtained.  




S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11. Search and seizure. 
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TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7. Searches and seizures; warrants. 
  




TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Searches and seizures. 
  
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18A-.001 to -.553 (West 2019); TEX. PENAL 




UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14. Unreasonable searches forbidden--Issuance of 
warrant. 
  










VA. CONST. art. I, § 10. General warrants of search or seizure prohibited. 
  
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 to -70 (West 2019). 
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Washington 
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited: “No 
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.” Id. 
  




W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6. Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. 
  




WIS. CONST. art. I, § 11. Searches and seizures. 
  




WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 4. Security against search and seizure. 
  
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-701 to -712 (West 2020). 
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Appendix B (continued) 
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APPENDIX C 
Applicable Provisions of State Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Statutes 
California 
California Penal Code section 632.5 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Every person who, maliciously and without the consent of all parties 
to the communication, intercepts, receives, or assists in intercepting or 
receiving a communication transmitted between cellular radio 
telephones or between any cellular radio telephone and a landline 
telephone shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five 
hundred dollars ($2,500), by imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one year or in the state prison, or by both that fine and 
imprisonment. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.5 (West 2020). 
Connecticut 
Connecticut General Statutes Annotated section 52-570d provides in pertinent 
part: 
(a) No person shall use any instrument, device or equipment to record 
an oral private telephonic communication unless the use of such 
instrument, device or equipment (1) is preceded by consent of all parties 
to the communication and such prior consent either is obtained in 
writing or is part of, and obtained at the start of, the recording, or (2) is 
preceded by verbal notification which is recorded at the beginning and 
is part of the communication by the recording party, or (3) is 
accompanied by an automatic tone warning device which automatically 
produces a distinct signal that is repeated at intervals of approximately 
fifteen seconds during the communication while such instrument, 
device or equipment is in use. 
 (b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to: 
(1) Any federal, state or local criminal law enforcement official or agent 
of any such official who in the lawful performance of such official or 
agent's duties, or at the request or direction of such official or agent in 
the performance of such official or agent's duties, records telephonic 
communications; [and] (3) Any person who, as the recipient of a 
telephonic communication which conveys threats of extortion, bodily 
harm or other unlawful requests or demands, records such telephonic 
communication . . . . 
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CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570d (West 2020). 
  
Florida 
Florida Statutes section 934.03 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person 
who: 
(a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication; 
(b) Intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to 
use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to 
intercept any oral communication when: 
1. Such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a 
wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or 
2. Such device transmits communications by radio or interferes with the 
transmission of such communication; 
(c) Intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person 
the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or 
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of 
this subsection; [or] 
(d) Intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know 
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, 
oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection 
 . . . . 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4). 
(2) . . .  
(c) It is lawful under this section and §§ 934.04-934.09 for an 
investigative or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the 
direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a 
wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to 
the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception 
is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. 
(d) It is lawful under this section and §§ 934.04-934.09 for a person to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when all of the 
parties to the communication have given prior consent to such 
interception. 
(e) It is unlawful to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication for the purpose of committing any criminal act.  
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720 Illinois Compiled Statutes section 5/14-1 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(d) Private conversation. 
For the purposes of this Article, “private conversation” means any oral 
communication between 2 or more persons, whether in person or 
transmitted between the parties by wire or other means, when one or 
more of the parties intended the communication to be of a private nature 
under circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation. A 
reasonable expectation shall include any expectation recognized by law, 
including, but not limited to, an expectation derived from a privilege, 
immunity, or right established by common law, Supreme Court rule, or 
the Illinois or United States Constitution. 
 
720 Illinois Compiled Statutes section 5/14-2 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the 
purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any 
private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she 
does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation 
. . . . 
 
720 Illinois Compiled Statutes section 5/14-3 provides in pertinent part:  
  
The following activities shall be exempt from the provisions of this 
Article: . . . 
(g) With prior notification to the State's Attorney of the county in which 
it is to occur, recording or listening with the aid of any device to any 
conversation where a law enforcement officer, or any person acting at 
the direction of law enforcement, is a party to the conversation and has 
consented to it being intercepted or recorded under circumstances 
where the use of the device is necessary for the protection of the law 
enforcement officer or any person acting at the direction of law 
enforcement, in the course of an investigation of a forcible felony, a 
felony offense of involuntary servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of 
a minor, or trafficking in persons under Section 10-9 of this Code, an 
offense involving prostitution, solicitation of a sexual act, or pandering, 
a felony violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, a felony 
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violation of the Cannabis Control Act, a felony violation of the 
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, any 
“streetgang related” or “gang-related” felony as those terms are defined 
in the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act, or any 
felony offense involving any weapon listed in paragraphs (1) through 
(11) of subsection (a) of Section 24-1 of this Code. Any recording or 
evidence derived as the result of this exemption shall be inadmissible in 
any proceeding, criminal, civil or administrative, except (i) where a 
party to the conversation suffers great bodily injury or is killed during 
such conversation, or (ii) when used as direct impeachment of a witness 
concerning matters contained in the interception or recording. The 
Director of the Department of State Police shall issue regulations as are 
necessary concerning the use of devices, retention of tape recordings, 
and reports regarding their use; . . . 
(g-6) With approval of the State's Attorney of the county in which it is 
to occur, recording or listening with the aid of any device to any 
conversation where a law enforcement officer, or any person acting at 
the direction of law enforcement, is a party to the conversation and has 
consented to it being intercepted or recorded in the course of an 
investigation of child pornography, aggravated child pornography, 
indecent solicitation of a child, luring of a minor, sexual exploitation of 
a child, aggravated criminal sexual abuse in which the victim of the 
offense was at the time of the commission of the offense under 18 years 
of age, or criminal sexual abuse by force or threat of force in which the 
victim of the offense was at the time of the commission of the offense 
under 18 years of age. In all such cases, an application for an order 
approving the previous or continuing use of an eavesdropping device 
must be made within 48 hours of the commencement of such use. In the 
absence of such an order, or upon its denial, any continuing use shall 
immediately terminate. The Director of State Police shall issue rules as 
are necessary concerning the use of devices, retention of recordings, and 
reports regarding their use. Any recording or evidence obtained or 
derived in the course of an investigation of child pornography, 
aggravated child pornography, indecent solicitation of a child, luring of 
a minor, sexual exploitation of a child, aggravated criminal sexual abuse 
in which the victim of the offense was at the time of the commission of 
the offense under 18 years of age, or criminal sexual abuse by force or 
threat of force in which the victim of the offense was at the time of the 
commission of the offense under 18 years of age shall, upon motion of 
the State's Attorney or Attorney General prosecuting any case involving 
child pornography, aggravated child pornography, indecent solicitation 
of a child, luring of a minor, sexual exploitation of a child, aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse in which the victim of the offense was at the time 
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of the commission of the offense under 18 years of age, or criminal 
sexual abuse by force or threat of force in which the victim of the 
offense was at the time of the commission of the offense under 18 years 
of age be reviewed in camera with notice to all parties present by the 
court presiding over the criminal case, and, if ruled by the court to be 
relevant and otherwise admissible, it shall be admissible at the trial of 
the criminal case. Absent such a ruling, any such recording or evidence 
shall not be admissible at the trial of the criminal case; 
(h) Recordings made simultaneously with the use of an in-car video 
camera recording of an oral conversation between a uniformed peace 
officer, who has identified his or her office, and a person in the presence 
of the peace officer whenever (i) an officer assigned a patrol vehicle is 
conducting an enforcement stop; or (ii) patrol vehicle emergency lights 
are activated or would otherwise be activated if not for the need to 
conceal the presence of law enforcement. 
For the purposes of this subsection (h), “enforcement stop” means an 
action by a law enforcement officer in relation to enforcement and 
investigation duties, including but not limited to, traffic stops, 
pedestrian stops, abandoned vehicle contacts, motorist assists, 
commercial motor vehicle stops, roadside safety checks, requests for 
identification, or responses to requests for emergency assistance; 
(h-5) Recordings of utterances made by a person while in the presence 
of a uniformed peace officer and while an occupant of a police vehicle 
including, but not limited to, (i) recordings made simultaneously with 
the use of an in-car video camera and (ii) recordings made in the 
presence of the peace officer utilizing video or audio systems, or both, 
authorized by the law enforcement agency; 
(h-10) Recordings made simultaneously with a video camera recording 
during the use of a taser or similar weapon or device by a peace officer 
if the weapon or device is equipped with such camera; 
(h-15) Recordings made under subsection (h), (h-5), or (h-10) shall be 
retained by the law enforcement agency that employs the peace officer 
who made the recordings for a storage period of 90 days, unless the 
recordings are made as a part of an arrest or the recordings are deemed 
evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding and then 
the recordings must only be destroyed upon a final disposition and an 
order from the court. Under no circumstances shall any recording be 
altered or erased prior to the expiration of the designated storage period. 
Upon completion of the storage period, the recording medium may be 
erased and reissued for operational use; 
(i) Recording of a conversation made by or at the request of a person, 
not a law enforcement officer or agent of a law enforcement officer, 
who is a party to the conversation, under reasonable suspicion that 
another party to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or 
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has committed a criminal offense against the person or a member of his 
or her immediate household, and there is reason to believe that evidence 
of the criminal offense may be obtained by the recording; . . . 
(k) Electronic recordings, including but not limited to, a motion picture, 
videotape, digital, or other visual or audio recording, made of a 
custodial interrogation of an individual at a police station or other place 
of detention by a law enforcement officer under Section 5-401.5 of the 
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or Section 103-2.1 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1963; 
(l) Recording the interview or statement of any person when the person 
knows that the interview is being conducted by a law enforcement 
officer or prosecutor and the interview takes place at a police station 
that is currently participating in the Custodial Interview Pilot Program 
established under the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Act; . . . 
(n) Recording or listening to an audio transmission from a microphone 
placed by a person under the authority of a law enforcement agency 
inside a bait car surveillance vehicle while simultaneously capturing a 
photographic or video image; 
(o) The use of an eavesdropping camera or audio device during an 
ongoing hostage or barricade situation by a law enforcement officer or 
individual acting on behalf of a law enforcement officer when the use 
of such device is necessary to protect the safety of the general public, 
hostages, or law enforcement officers or anyone acting on their behalf; 
. . . 
(q)(1) With prior request to and written or verbal approval of the State's 
Attorney of the county in which the conversation is anticipated to occur, 
recording or listening with the aid of an eavesdropping device to a 
conversation in which a law enforcement officer, or any person acting 
at the direction of a law enforcement officer, is a party to the 
conversation and has consented to the conversation being intercepted or 
recorded in the course of an investigation of a qualified offense. The 
State's Attorney may grant this approval only after determining that 
reasonable cause exists to believe that inculpatory conversations 
concerning a qualified offense will occur with a specified individual or 
individuals within a designated period of time. 
(2) Request for approval. To invoke the exception contained in this 
subsection (q), a law enforcement officer shall make a request for 
approval to the appropriate State's Attorney. The request may be written 
or verbal; however, a written memorialization of the request must be 
made by the State's Attorney. This request for approval shall include 
whatever information is deemed necessary by the State's Attorney but 
shall include, at a minimum, the following information about each 
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specified individual whom the law enforcement officer believes will 
commit a qualified offense: 
(A) his or her full or partial name, nickname or alias; 
(B) a physical description; or 
(C) failing either (A) or (B) of this paragraph (2), any other supporting 
information known to the law enforcement officer at the time of the 
request that gives rise to reasonable cause to believe that the specified 
individual will participate in an inculpatory conversation concerning a 
qualified offense. 
(3) Limitations on approval. Each written approval by the State's 
Attorney under this subsection (q) shall be limited to: 
(A) a recording or interception conducted by a specified law 
enforcement officer or person acting at the direction of a law 
enforcement officer; 
(B) recording or intercepting conversations with the individuals 
specified in the request for approval, provided that the verbal approval 
shall be deemed to include the recording or intercepting of 
conversations with other individuals, unknown to the law enforcement 
officer at the time of the request for approval, who are acting in 
conjunction with or as co-conspirators with the individuals specified in 
the request for approval in the commission of a qualified offense; 
(C) a reasonable period of time but in no event longer than 24 
consecutive hours; 
(D) the written request for approval, if applicable, or the written 
memorialization must be filed, along with the written approval, with the 
circuit clerk of the jurisdiction on the next business day following the 
expiration of the authorized period of time, and shall be subject to 
review by the Chief Judge or his or her designee as deemed appropriate 
by the court. 
(3.5) The written memorialization of the request for approval and the 
written approval by the State's Attorney may be in any format, including 
via facsimile, email, or otherwise, so long as it is capable of being filed 
with the circuit clerk. 
(3.10) Beginning March 1, 2015, each State's Attorney shall annually 
submit a report to the General Assembly disclosing: 
(A) the number of requests for each qualified offense for approval under 
this subsection; and 
(B) the number of approvals for each qualified offense given by the 
State's Attorney. 
(4) Admissibility of evidence. No part of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication that has been recorded or intercepted 
as a result of this exception may be received in evidence in any trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
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other authority of this State, or a political subdivision of the State, other 
than in a prosecution of: 
(A) the qualified offense for which approval was given to record or 
intercept a conversation under this subsection (q); 
(B) a forcible felony committed directly in the course of the 
investigation of the qualified offense for which approval was given to 
record or intercept a conversation under this subsection (q); or 
(C) any other forcible felony committed while the recording or 
interception was approved in accordance with this subsection (q), but 
for this specific category of prosecutions, only if the law enforcement 
officer or person acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer 
who has consented to the conversation being intercepted or recorded 
suffers great bodily injury or is killed during the commission of the 
charged forcible felony. 
(5) Compliance with the provisions of this subsection is a prerequisite 
to the admissibility in evidence of any part of the contents of any wire, 
electronic or oral communication that has been intercepted as a result 
of this exception, but nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to 
prevent a court from otherwise excluding the evidence on any other 
ground recognized by State or federal law, nor shall anything in this 
subsection be deemed to prevent a court from independently reviewing 
the admissibility of the evidence for compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or with Article I, Section 6 of the 
Illinois Constitution. 
(6) Use of recordings or intercepts unrelated to qualified offenses. 
Whenever any private conversation or private electronic 
communication has been recorded or intercepted as a result of this 
exception that is not related to an offense for which the recording or 
intercept is admissible under paragraph (4) of this subsection (q), no 
part of the contents of the communication and evidence derived from 
the communication may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
this State, or a political subdivision of the State, nor may it be publicly 
disclosed in any way. 
(6.5) The Department of State Police shall adopt rules as are necessary 
concerning the use of devices, retention of recordings, and reports 
regarding their use under this subsection (q). 
(7) Definitions. For the purposes of this subsection (q) only: 
“Forcible felony” includes and is limited to those offenses contained in 
Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 as of the effective date of this 
amendatory Act of the 97th General Assembly, and only as those 
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offenses have been defined by law or judicial interpretation as of that 
date. 
“Qualified offense” means and is limited to: 
(A) a felony violation of the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois 
Controlled Substances Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and 
Community Protection Act, except for violations of: 
(i) Section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act; 
(ii) Section 402 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act; and 
(iii) Section 60 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community 
Protection Act; and 
(B) first degree murder, solicitation of murder for hire, predatory 
criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault, aggravated 
criminal sexual assault, aggravated arson, kidnapping, aggravated 
kidnapping, child abduction, trafficking in persons, involuntary 
servitude, involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, or gunrunning. 
“State's Attorney” includes and is limited to the State's Attorney or an 
assistant State's Attorney designated by the State's Attorney to provide 
verbal approval to record or intercept conversations under this 
subsection (q). . . . 
  
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -3 (West 2020)(footnotes omitted). 
  
Maryland 
Maryland Code Annotated, Courts & Judicial Procedure section 10-402 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
In general 
(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle it is 
unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Willfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other 
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication; [or] 
(2) Willfully disclose, or endeavor to disclose, to any other person the 
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or 
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of 
this subtitle . . . . 
  
Authorized interceptions, procurements, disclosures, or use of 
communications  
(c). . .  
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(2)(i) This paragraph applies to an interception in which: 
1. The investigative or law enforcement officer or other person is a party 
to the communication; or 
2. One of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to 
the interception. 
(ii) It is lawful under this subtitle for an investigative or law 
enforcement officer acting in a criminal investigation or any other 
person acting at the prior direction and under the supervision of an 
investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication in order to provide evidence: 




D. A sexual offense in the first or second degree; 
E. Child abuse in the first or second degree; 
F. Child pornography under § 11-207, § 11-208, or § 11-208.1 of the 
Criminal Law Article; 
G. Gambling; 
H. Robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of the Criminal Law Article; 
I. A felony under Title 6, Subtitle 1 of the Criminal Law Article; 
J. Bribery; 
K. Extortion; 
L. Dealing in a controlled dangerous substance, including a violation of 
§ 5-617 or § 5-619 of the Criminal Law Article; 
M. A fraudulent insurance act, as defined in Title 27, Subtitle 4 of the 
Insurance Article; 
N. An offense relating to destructive devices under § 4-503 of the 
Criminal Law Article; 
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O. A human trafficking offense under Title 3, Subtitle 11 of the 
Criminal Law Article; 
P. Sexual solicitation of a minor under § 3-324 of the Criminal Law 
Article; 
Q. An offense relating to obstructing justice under § 9-302, § 9-303, or 
§ 9-305 of the Criminal Law Article; 
R. Sexual abuse of a minor under § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article; 
S. A theft scheme or continuing course of conduct under § 7-103(f) of 
the Criminal Law Article involving an aggregate value of property or 
services of at least $10,000; 
T. Abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult under § 3-604 or § 3-605 of 
the Criminal Law Article; 
U. An offense relating to Medicaid fraud under §§ 8-509 through 8-515 
of the Criminal Law Article; 
V. An offense involving a firearm under § 5-134, § 5-136, § 5-138, § 5-
140, § 5-141, or § 5-144 of the Public Safety Article; or 
W. A conspiracy or solicitation to commit an offense listed in items A 
through V of this item; or 
2. If: 
A. A person has created a barricade situation; and 
B. Probable cause exists for the investigative or law enforcement officer 
to believe a hostage or hostages may be involved. 
(3) It is lawful under this subtitle for a person to intercept a wire, oral, 
or electronic communication where the person is a party to the 
communication and where all of the parties to the communication have 
given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of this 
State. 
(4)(i) It is lawful under this subtitle for a law enforcement officer in the 
course of the officer's regular duty to intercept an oral communication 
if: 
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1. The law enforcement officer initially lawfully detained a vehicle 
during a criminal investigation or for a traffic violation; 
2. The law enforcement officer is a party to the oral communication; 
3. The law enforcement officer has been identified as a law enforcement 
officer to the other parties to the oral communication prior to any 
interception; 
4. The law enforcement officer informs all other parties to the 
communication of the interception at the beginning of the 
communication; and 
5. The oral interception is being made as part of a video tape recording. 
(ii) If all of the requirements of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph are 
met, an interception is lawful even if a person becomes a party to the 
communication following: 
1. The identification required under subparagraph (i)3 of this paragraph; 
or 
2. The informing of the parties required under subparagraph (i)4 of this 
paragraph. 
(5) It is lawful under this subtitle for an officer, employee, or agent of a 
governmental emergency communications center to intercept a wire, 
oral, or electronic communication where the officer, agent, or employee 
is a party to a conversation concerning an emergency. 
(6)(i) It is lawful under this subtitle for law enforcement personnel to 
utilize body wires to intercept oral communications in the course of a 
criminal investigation if there is reasonable cause to believe that a law 
enforcement officer's safety may be in jeopardy. 
(ii) Communications intercepted under this paragraph may not be 
recorded, and may not be used against the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding. 
 . . . . 
 
(9) It is lawful under this subtitle for a person to intercept a wire or 
electronic communication in the course of a law enforcement 
investigation of possible telephone solicitation theft if: 
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(i) The person is an investigative or law enforcement officer or is acting 
under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer; and 
(ii) The person is a party to the communication and participates in the 
communication through the use of a telephone instrument. 
(10) It is lawful under this subtitle for a person to intercept a wire, oral, 
or electronic communication in the course of a law enforcement 
investigation in order to provide evidence of the commission of vehicle 
theft if: 
(i) The person is an investigative or law enforcement officer or is acting 
under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer; and 
(ii) The device through which the interception is made has been placed 
within a vehicle by or at the direction of law enforcement personnel 
under circumstances in which it is thought that vehicle theft may occur. 
(11)(i) 1. In this paragraph the following words have the meanings 
indicated. 
2. “Body-worn digital recording device” means a device worn on the 
person of a law enforcement officer that is capable of recording video 
and intercepting oral communications. 
3. “Electronic control device” has the meaning stated in § 4-109 of the 
Criminal Law Article. 
(ii) It is lawful under this subtitle for a law enforcement officer in the 
course of the officer's regular duty to intercept an oral communication 
with a body-worn digital recording device or an electronic control 
device capable of recording video and oral communications if: 
1. The law enforcement officer is in uniform or prominently displaying 
the officer's badge or other insignia; 
2. The law enforcement officer is making reasonable efforts to conform 
to standards in accordance with § 3-511 of the Public Safety Article for 
the use of body-worn digital recording devices or electronic control 
devices capable of recording video and oral communications; 
3. The law enforcement officer is a party to the oral communication; 
4. Law enforcement notifies, as soon as is practicable, the individual 
that the individual is being recorded, unless it is unsafe, impractical, or 
impossible to do so; and 
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5. The oral interception is being made as part of a videotape or digital 
recording. 
(iii) Failure to notify under subparagraph (ii)4 of this paragraph does 
not affect the admissibility in court of the recording if the failure to 
notify involved an individual who joined a discussion in progress for 
which proper notification was previously given. 




Massachusetts General Laws Annotated chapter 272, section 99 provides in 
pertinent part: 
B. Definitions. As used in this section--. . . . 4. The term ‘interception’ 
means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear 
or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication 
through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a 
person given prior authority by all parties to such communication; 
provided that it shall not constitute an interception for an investigative 
or law enforcement officer, as defined in this section, to record or 
transmit a wire or oral communication if the officer is a party to such 
communication or has been given prior authorization to record or 
transmit the communication by such a party and if recorded or 
transmitted in the course of an investigation of a designated offense as 
defined herein. 




Michigan Compiled Laws sections 750.539a, 750.539c, 750.539g provide in 
pertinent part: 
Sec. 539a. . . As used in sections 539a to 539i:. . . (2) “Eavesdrop” or 
“eavesdropping” means to overhear, record, amplify or transmit any 
part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all 
persons engaged in the discourse. Neither this definition or any other 
provision of this act shall modify or affect any law or regulation 
concerning interception, divulgence or recording of messages 
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transmitted by communications common carriers. . . . 
Sec. 539c. Any person who is present or who is not present during a 
private conversation and who wilfully uses any device to eavesdrop 
upon the conversation without the consent of all parties thereto, or who 
knowingly aids, employs or procures another person to do the same in 
violation of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 2 years or by a fine of 
not more than $ 2,000.00, or both. 
  
Sec. 539g. Sections 539a to 539f do not prohibit any of the following: 
(a) Eavesdropping or surveillance not otherwise prohibited by law by a 
peace officer of this state or of the federal government, or the officer’s 
agent, while in the performance of the officer’s duties. . . . 
  




Montana Code Annotated section 45-8-213 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as provided in 69-6-104, a person commits the offense of 
violating privacy in communications if he knowingly or purposely: . . . 
. (c) records or causes to be recorded any conversation by use of a 
hidden electronic or mechanical device which reproduces a human 
conversation without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation.  
(2)(a) Subsection (1)(c) does not apply to: 
(i) elected or appointed public officials or to public employees when 
the transcription or recording is done in the performance of official 
duty . . . . 
  





Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated section 200.620 provides in pertinent part: 
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 179.410 to 179.515, 
inclusive, 209.419 and 704.195, it is unlawful for any person to 
intercept or attempt to intercept any wire communication unless: 
(a) The interception or attempted interception is made with the prior 
consent of one of the parties to the communication; and 
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(b) An emergency situation exists and it is impractical to obtain a 
court order as required by NRS 179.410 to 179.515, inclusive, before 
the interception, in which event the interception is subject to the 
requirements of subsection 3. If the application for ratification is 
denied, any use or disclosure of the information so intercepted is 
unlawful, and the person who made the interception shall notify the 
sender and the receiver of the communication that: 
(1) The communication was intercepted; and 
(2) Upon application to the court, ratification of the interception was 
denied. 
 . . . . 
3. Any person who has made an interception in an emergency situation 
as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection 1 shall, within 72 hours of 
the interception, make a written application to a justice of the Supreme 
Court or district judge for ratification of the interception. The 
interception must not be ratified unless the applicant shows that: 
(a) An emergency situation existed and it was impractical to obtain a 
court order before the interception; and 
(b) Except for the absence of a court order, the interception met the 
requirements of NRS 179.410 to 179.515, inclusive. 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.620 (West 2019). 
  
New Hampshire 
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated section 570-A:2 provides in 
pertinent part: 
I. A person is guilty of a class B felony if, except as otherwise 
specifically provided in this chapter or without the consent of all parties 
to the communication, the person: 
(a) Wilfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other 
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any telecommunication or 
oral communication; 
(b) Wilfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use 
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or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to 
intercept any oral communication when: 
(1) Such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a 
wire, cable, or other like connection used in telecommunication, or 
(2) Such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with 
the transmission of such communication, or 
(3) Such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on premises of any 
business or other commercial establishment, or (B) obtains or is for the 
purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any 
business or other commercial establishment; or 
(c) Wilfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the 
contents of any telecommunication or oral communication, knowing or 
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a telecommunication or oral communication in violation 
of this paragraph; or 
(d) Willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any 
telecommunication or oral communication, knowing or having reason 
to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a 
telecommunication or oral communication in violation of this 
paragraph. . . . 
II. It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for: . . . 
(c) Any law enforcement officer, when conducting investigations of or 
making arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, to carry on the 
person an electronic, mechanical or other device which intercepts oral 
communications and transmits such communications by radio. 
(d) An investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course 
of the officer's duties pertaining to the conducting of investigations of 
organized crime, offenses enumerated in this chapter, solid waste 
violations under RSA 149-M:9, I and II, or harassing or obscene 
telephone calls to intercept a telecommunication or oral 
communication, when such person is a party to the communication or 
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such 
interception; provided, however, that no such interception shall be made 
unless the attorney general, the deputy attorney general, or an assistant 
attorney general designated by the attorney general determines that 
there exists a reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct 
will be derived from such interception. Oral authorization for the 
interception may be given and a written memorandum of said 
determination and its basis shall be made within 72 hours thereafter. 
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The memorandum shall be kept on file in the office of the attorney 
general. . . . 
(g) Any law enforcement officer, when conducting investigations of or 
making arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, to carry on the 
person an electronic, mechanical or other device which intercepts oral 
communications and transmits such communications by radio. 
  




Oregon Revised Statutes section 165.540 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724 or 133.726 or 
subsections (2) to (7) of this section, a person may not: 
(a) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a 
telecommunication or a radio communication to which the person is not 
a participant, by means of any device, contrivance, machine or 
apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless 
consent is given by at least one participant. . . . 
(c) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a conversation 
by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether 
electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, if not all participants in the 
conversation are specifically informed that their conversation is being 
obtained. . . . 
(5) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not apply to: 
(a) A person who records a conversation during a felony that endangers 
human life; 
(b) A person who records a conversation in which a law enforcement 
officer is a participant, if: 
(A) The recording is made while the officer is performing official 
duties; 
(B) The recording is made openly and in plain view of the participants 
in the conversation; 
(C) The conversation being recorded is audible to the person by normal 
unaided hearing; and 
(D) The person is in a place where the person lawfully may be . . . . 
 
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 165.540 (West 2020). 
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Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes title 18, section 5703 provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree if he: 
(1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or 
oral communication; 
(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person 
the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence 
derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the 
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic 
or oral communication; or 
(3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, 
electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, 
knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained 
through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication. 
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2020). 
 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes title 18, section 5704 provides in pertinent 
part: 
  
It shall not be unlawful and no prior court approval shall be required 
under this chapter for: . . . 
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any person acting 
at the direction or request of an investigative or law enforcement officer 
to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication involving 
suspected criminal activities, including, but not limited to, the crimes 
enumerated in section 5708 (relating to order authorizing interception 
of wire, electronic or oral communications), where: 
(i) Deleted. 
(ii) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to 
such interception. However, no interception under this paragraph shall 
be made unless the Attorney General or a deputy attorney general 
designated in writing by the Attorney General, or the district attorney, 
or an assistant district attorney designated in writing by the district 
attorney, of the county wherein the interception is to be initiated, has 
reviewed the facts and is satisfied that the consent is voluntary and has 
given prior approval for the interception; however, such interception 
shall be subject to the recording and record keeping requirements of 
section 5714(a) (relating to recording of intercepted communications) 
106 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
and that the Attorney General, deputy attorney general, district attorney 
or assistant district attorney authorizing the interception shall be the 
custodian of recorded evidence obtained therefrom; 
(iii) the investigative or law enforcement officer meets in person with a 
suspected felon and wears a concealed electronic or mechanical device 
capable of intercepting or recording oral communications. However, no 
interception under this subparagraph may be used in any criminal 
prosecution except for a prosecution involving harm done to the 
investigative or law enforcement officer. This subparagraph shall not 
be construed to limit the interception and disclosure authority provided 
for in this subchapter; or 
(iv) the requirements of this subparagraph are met. If an oral 
interception otherwise authorized under this paragraph will take place 
in the home of a nonconsenting party, then, in addition to the 
requirements of subparagraph (ii), the interception shall not be 
conducted until an order is first obtained from the president judge, or 
his designee who shall also be a judge, of a court of common pleas, 
authorizing such in-home interception, based upon an affidavit by an 
investigative or law enforcement officer that establishes probable cause 
for the issuance of such an order. No such order or affidavit shall be 
required where probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. For the 
purposes of this paragraph, an oral interception shall be deemed to take 
place in the home of a nonconsenting party only if both the consenting 
and nonconsenting parties are physically present in the home at the time 
of the interception. . . . 
(4) A person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, 
where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such 
interception. 
 
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2020).  
  
Washington 
Revised Code of Washington section 9.73.030 provides in pertinent part: 
  
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for 
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of 
Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or 
record any: 
(a) Private communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, 
or other device between two or more individuals between points within 
or without the state by any device electronic or otherwise designed to 
record and/or transmit said communication regardless how such device 
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is powered or actuated, without first obtaining the consent of all the 
participants in the communication; 
(b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed 
to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is 
powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the 
persons engaged in the conversation. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, wire 
communications or conversations (a) of an emergency nature, such as 
the reporting of a fire, medical emergency, crime, or disaster, or (b) 
which convey threats of extortion, blackmail, bodily harm, or other 
unlawful requests or demands, or (c) which occur anonymously or 
repeatedly or at an extremely inconvenient hour, or (d) which relate to 
communications by a hostage holder or barricaded person as defined in 
RCW 70.85.100, whether or not conversation ensues, may be recorded 
with the consent of one party to the conversation. 
 
Revised Code of Washington section 9.73.110 provides: 
  
It shall not be unlawful for the owner or person entitled to use and 
possession of a building, as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(5), or the agent 
of such person, to intercept, record, or disclose communications or 
conversations which occur within such building if the persons engaged 
in such communication or conversation are engaged in a criminal act at 
the time of such communication or conversation by virtue of unlawful 
entry or remaining unlawfully in such building. 
  
Revised Code of Washington section 9.73.200 provides: 
  
The legislature finds that the unlawful manufacturing, selling, and 
distributing of controlled substances is becoming increasingly prevalent 
and violent. Attempts by law enforcement officers to prevent the 
manufacture, sale, and distribution of drugs is resulting in numerous 
life-threatening situations since drug dealers are using sophisticated 
weapons and modern technological devices to deter the efforts of law 
enforcement officials to enforce the controlled substance statutes. 
Dealers of unlawful drugs are employing a wide variety of violent 
methods to realize the enormous profits of the drug trade. 
Therefore, the legislature finds that conversations regarding illegal drug 
operations should be intercepted, transmitted, and recorded in certain 
circumstances without prior judicial approval in order to protect the life 
and safety of law enforcement personnel and to enhance prosecution of 
drug offenses, and that that interception and transmission can be done 
without violating the constitutional guarantees of privacy. 
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Revised Code of Washington section 9.73.210 provides in pertinent part: 
  
(1) If a police commander or officer above the rank of first line 
supervisor has reasonable suspicion that the safety of the consenting 
party is in danger, law enforcement personnel may, for the sole purpose 
of protecting the safety of the consenting party, intercept, transmit, or 
record a private conversation or communication concerning: 
(a) The unlawful manufacture, delivery, sale, or possession with intent 
to manufacture, deliver, or sell, controlled substances as defined in 
chapter 69.50 RCW, or legend drugs as defined in chapter 69.41 RCW, 
or imitation controlled substances as defined in chapter 69.52 RCW; or 
(b) Person(s) engaging in the commercial sexual abuse of a minor under 
RCW 9.68A.100, or promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor 
under RCW 9.68A.101, or promoting travel for commercial sexual 
abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.102. 
(2) Before any interception, transmission, or recording of a private 
conversation or communication pursuant to this section, the police 
commander or officer making the determination required by subsection 
(1) of this section shall complete a written authorization which shall 
include (a) the date and time the authorization is given; (b) the persons, 
including the consenting party, expected to participate in the 
conversation or communication, to the extent known; (c) the expected 
date, location, and approximate time of the conversation or 
communication; and (d) the reasons for believing the consenting party's 
safety will be in danger. . . . 
(7) Nothing in this section authorizes the interception, recording, or 
transmission of a telephonic communication or conversation.  
 
Revised Code of Washington section 9.73.230 provides in pertinent part: 
  
(1) As part of a bona fide criminal investigation, the chief law 
enforcement officer of a law enforcement agency or his or her designee 
above the rank of first line supervisor may authorize the interception, 
transmission, or recording of a conversation or communication by 
officers under the following circumstances: 
(a) At least one party to the conversation or communication has 
consented to the interception, transmission, or recording; 
(b) Probable cause exists to believe that the conversation or 
communication involves: 
(i) The unlawful manufacture, delivery, sale, or possession with intent 
to manufacture, deliver, or sell, controlled substances as defined in 
chapter 69.50 RCW, or legend drugs as defined in chapter 69.41 RCW, 
or imitation controlled substances as defined in chapter 69.52 RCW; or 
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(ii) A party engaging in the commercial sexual abuse of a minor under 
RCW 9.68A.100, or promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor 
under RCW 9.68A.101, or promoting travel for commercial sexual 
abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.102; and 
(c) A written report has been completed as required by subsection (2) 
of this section. 
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